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Vulnerability in software receives constant attention in the media and in research.
Yearly rates of disclosure of vulnerabilities in software have doubled. The discipline of
Information Assurance lacks metrics that are useful in understanding vulnerability. In the
problem of vulnerability assessment tool selection, users must make product choices based
on results found in non-peer reviewed publications or subjective opinion.

Users of

vulnerability assessment tools must sift through volumes of data about their systems and
are shown broad indications of the severity of the problems – often a high-medium-low
ranking, which varies between tools. A need exists for metrics and a selection model for
tool quality assessment. This study addresses these needs by analysis of the discipline of
vulnerability assessment and remediation from first principles, and presents an organized
approach and a best-fit metrics based model for selecting vulnerability assessment tools.
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NOMENCLATURE

AIS - Automated Information System; any equipment of an interconnected system or
subsystems of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation,
control, display, transmission, or reception of data and includes software, firmware, and
hardware [44].
At-large set of measures - The union of all measures extracted from prior work, and
derived as part of the IA metrics taxonomy [59].
Benchmark - a standard measure or point of reference for judging quality.
Information Assurance - Information operations that protect and defend information and
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality,
and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities [44].
Measure – a definite unit of capacity or extent in terms of which the size or capacity of
things are ascertained e.g., distance.
Metric – a composite of measures established to assess the comparative quality or extent of
similar things, e.g., distance traveled per unit time; speed.
Taxonomy - the study of the general principles of scientific classification.
VAST – vulnerability assessment scanning tool, designed to perform diagnostic tests on
operating systems to identify areas of known vulnerability.

ix

Vulnerability Assessment - systematic examination of an automated information system
(AIS) or product to determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security
deficiencies, provide data from which to predict the effectiveness of proposed security
measures, and confirm the adequacy of such measures after implementation [44].
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
With

the

increased

implementation

of

computing

equipment

and

the

interconnectedness of this equipment by communications networks, worldwide commerce
is increasingly conducted in cyberspace. Threats to the computing infrastructure therefore
pose threats to commerce. Reduction of these threats and vulnerabilities in computing is
one of the primary objectives of Information Assurance (IA) and is the area of focus in this
study. The definition of IA within this study is adopted from the NSA Glossary of Terms
and is provided in the Nomenclature section along with other terms germane to this study.
Protection includes detection, remediation, and prevention of incidents that pose threats to
the data and its native processing environment. Such environments differ among each
owning organization, and with this, an implication of divergent priorities emerges.
Users and implementers of IA technology have a wide range of products from
which to choose their solution. The choice of solution is traditionally based on cost,
appropriateness of solution offered, and the information technology (IT) staff familiarity
with a specific solution. Frequently an incorrect or ineffective choice is made prior to
finding the most appropriate solution. Correct decisions are possible when the acquirer has
adequate means to compare and assess contending alternatives. Many disciplines have
developed definitive benchmarks and metrics upon which comparisons are based.
Examples from IT include the Transaction Processing Performance Council’s database
1
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query performance benchmarks [53], and the Text Retrieval Conferences (TREC)
sponsored by the United States National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST),
and the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA) [57]. The TREC provides
a reference set of documents by which organizations may evaluate text retrieval
technology. A much more common example of a metric is miles per gallon; cited in
automobile advertising as a uniform means of comparison for consumers.

Thus, a

consumer with fuel costs as a high priority has a strong predictor in his or her choice of an
appropriate car. A purchaser relying only on a single benchmark is susceptible to making a
less than optimal decision. A family of eight with a fuel economy priority would be
disappointed in relying solely on fuel efficiency and ignoring seating capacity in
purchasing a car. Yet, many purchasers of IT security products use this analog in deciding
on available comparison metrics.

In making such choices, deep differences between

contending products can be overlooked and only detected well after the product has been
deployed and expectations are unmet.
Competition for market share drives the demand for continual improvement by
contending vendors. A critical area for commercial firms is that of customer retention; this
motivates the development of higher quality products, with fewer defects, more features,
and better support.

Product quality follows from process quality.

Process quality

assessment is a reliable means to mark process improvement. Quality assessment practices
such as the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model (CMM), and
international quality programs such as ISO-9000 provide valuable frameworks and
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standards, which serve to rate the proficiency of each organization. The improved quality
of process yields improved product or service quality. These assessments are becoming
mandatory for long-term marketplace success. For example, governments such as that in
the United States have declared that large IT and defense contracts will be awarded only to
organizations attaining or exceeding CMM level three. One could infer that process
maturity ratings play a role in the overall quality of products.
The field of IA is new by comparison to other engineering or industrial disciplines
such as civil engineering or shipbuilding.

Yet increases in criticality of information

systems and the quick dissemination of tools for exploitation of vulnerabilities in systems,
make it increasingly important to develop quality IA assessment and repair tools. Quality
in anything is more readily realized when a notion of measuring it exists, and regular the
use of measurements takes place. Quality focused organizations install processes and
metrics to assess them; as this is expected of CMM level three organizations. This same
degree of discipline is needed in the IA tool development and assessment community.
Analysis of the Carnegie-Mellon Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
vulnerability incident data shows that attacks become widespread within three months of
publication of a scripted exploit [4]. Yet the vendor identifying a patch consumes the first
month of this time period, and vulnerability tool vendors developing checks, and releasing
their next updates require time beyond the release of the patch. The Blaster worm released
in the summer of 2003 showed that vulnerability assessment (VA) tool vendors have
improved the time from detection to dissemination as is presented in the analysis phase of
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this study available in the Appendix.

Hence, the user of vulnerability tools has a

significantly reduced time window to detect and repair vulnerabilities.

Attempts to

decrease the time to product update are occurring, and over time, response should improve.
Increasing the energy and resources applied to the quality of IA solutions is critical.
Comparisons of vulnerability assessment tools are driven by limited factors such as ability
to detect or report on a small set of known vulnerabilities [3, 22, 38].

This single

dimension is given heavy reliance by readers of comparison reports since most users and
even professionals do not have the time, resources, expertise, or a frame of reference to
study all dimensions rigorously. Development of representative and accurate vulnerability
assessment tool performance metrics, with repeatable and reliable testing and measurement
processes will greatly assist the entire IA and IT communities.
The problem of useful measurement and assessment of IA solutions deserves
careful study. The scope of this study is the application of the knowledge and process of
metric development to the IA discipline of vulnerability assessment. The specific IA sub
discipline of vulnerability detection and removal is studied and discussed. This dimension
was selected as a starting point because of the number of tools available, their familiarity
within the IT and IA communities, the frequent comparisons found in IT trade magazines,
and the potential of the results to provide insight to a large number of IA stakeholders
enabling them to make choices that are more effective.
Another problem facing IT security professionals regarding use of vulnerability
assessment tools is in prioritizing the solutions. The tools generally identify vulnerability
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severity via a qualitative high, medium, low, scale. These terms are ambiguous (or fuzzy),
and have differing interpretations across vendors. In such cases where the state of an
exploit of a vulnerability can change from unknown to published overnight, one may never
do better than an ordinal severity scale, however finer grains of distinction may prove
valuable. This comes to the fore, as one understands that vulnerabilities may exist at
different points in their respective life cycles. Given two vulnerabilities, within the same
classification of severity, and both having known patches or other remediation strategies, a
vulnerability having a published exploitation script is of greater urgency to repair than one
without a known, published exploit.
Results of this study show that IA solutions can be meaningfully assessable and
measurable for each organization. Another product will be development of metrics to
assess the quality, precision, speed, ownership cost, and repair cost for a given
organization.
Chapter II addresses prior work in areas related to this study effort.

The

development of vulnerability classification systems is presented in search of a meaningful
approach to classify vulnerabilities in a way that is useful for IT staffs. Other work on
software defect classification and security policy classification is examined. Since the goal
of this work is to produce metrics or measures for vulnerability assessment tool evaluation,
we will also examine the topic of IA metrics and the properties of useful metrics in general.
The topic of vulnerability remediation is examined to highlight areas of this crucial task
that should be considered in vulnerability tool comparisons. Thus, this chapter illustrates
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that a framework upon which an IT organization can assess vulnerabilities as they relate to
their own environments is needed. Currently intuitive sense and experience dictates the
priority of treatment of vulnerability in systems. Chapter III presents the methodology used
to develop a tool evaluation best-fit model, and the measurement protocol used in carrying
out assessment of the tools. Chapter IV describes application of the methodology and
validation of the methodology and model; providing comparisons between the model and a
super set of measures across the categories of the IA metrics taxonomy. Chapter V
presents the conclusions of the research and results of use of the model. An Appendix
following the work provides explanations of all measures taken during the study and
provides relevance to the IA metrics categories to which the measures are assigned.

CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
The focus of this study is on objective comparisons of vulnerability assessment
(VA) tool options by procuring organizations. This requires knowledge of vulnerabilities,
measurements and metrics, vulnerability assessment, and security policies. This chapter
explores previous work for contributions to this effort, whether directly or indirectly.
Previous research exists in classification of system vulnerabilities, (as well as their life
cycle and remediation), the classification of security policies, the proper selection of and
construction of metrics, the overall discipline of information assurance, and the IA
discipline of vulnerability identification and remediation.

We begin by reviewing

vulnerability classification work.
Classification of flaws in software, and their active manifestations as faults or
vulnerability-faults with security consequences has been approached from many
perspectives. Before discussing the related work in vulnerability classification, we mention
the general properties that a taxonomy should possess. A taxonomy should have both an
explanatory and a predictive value [30]. The taxonomy should be explanatory in the sense
of sorting and organizing individual classes, and predictive in the sense that types not yet
encountered may be accounted for, making prediction of their occurrence and their
recognition easier.

This investigation illustrates properties of vulnerabilities that

vulnerability assessment tools may measure or present within their results.
7
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2.1 Vulnerability Taxonomies
We now address the classification of vulnerability in computing systems through
the past thirty-seven years.
In 1967, the Defense Science Board Task Force investigation [62], prompted the
United States Federal Government to launch studies into the state of security protection
within its computing centers. The results were unsettling to many and fueled the research
thrust into security of computing systems. Penetration testing was studied intensively.
Linde provided an early insight into classification of faults with the Flaw Hypothesis
Methodology [32]. Two studies in the 1970’s centered on the then common computing
environment consisting of mainframe systems.

The paragraphs that follow present

overviews of the contributing work in vulnerability classification.
2.1.1 Linde’s Flaw Hypothesis Methodology (1975)
Linde developed a systems penetration strategy that is useful for identifying
weaknesses in the functional areas of operating system design. The hypothesis decomposes
into four steps [32] as seen in Table 2.1. This work stimulated many later studies, and
established the classic approach used by system penetration red teams to this day. The
steps of obtaining knowledge, formulating a hypothesis of vulnerability within the system,
testing the hypothesis, and finally generalizing about the flaw-discovered form the core of
well-known strategies used in vulnerability assessment.
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Table 2.1 Flaw Hypothesis Methodology Taxonomy
Step
Obtain
knowledge of
system’s control
structures
Formulate a flaw
hypothesis
Confirm the flaw
hypothesis
Construct a flaw
generalization

Element
inter-module knowledge, access control mechanisms, control
object hierarchy, intra-module knowledge, and specific
implementation
hypothesis of vulnerability through information from source
code, design documents
writing software exploits against the hypothetical vulnerability
generalize about vulnerability through knowledge of similar
systems, and from study of other parts of the system under
study).

2.1.2 RISOS Project (1976)
Abbott and his research group at the United States Department of Energy Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory’s Institute for Computer Science and Technology undertook the
Research into Security of Operating Systems (RISOS) effort to understand system faults.
This laboratory conducts research into nuclear power and weaponry, thus systems it
maintains are critical.

The project had the goal of understanding security issues in

operating systems and exploration of approaches for addressing them by understanding
faults and analyzing new faults as they were discovered. Seven broad categories resulted,
that attempt to generalize software faults across several operating systems [1]. The RISOS
classification is shown in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2 RISOS Taxonomy
Software fault
Incomplete parameter
validation
Inconsistent parameter
validation
Implicit sharing of
confidential data
Asynchronous
validation/Inadequate
serialization
Inadequate identification,
authentication and
authorization
Violable prohibition and
limits
Exploitable logic errors

Nature of problem
value validation of arguments of procedure calls
multiple sets of validation criteria exist in a system, and a
‘wrong’ set is used
information from highly privileged processes is disclosed
to lesser-privileged processes
serialization of data storage and access is not enforced

no uniquely distinguishing login session contexts, (this is
the MS-DOS system model)
enforced on accesses to data structures maintained by the
system
incorrect error handling sequences, side effects of
untested instructions and sporadic timing features

Note that incomplete parameter validation was discovered in 1976, and remains a
frequent target of exploitation.

Parameter validation is critical in requests by low-

privileged user processes for services from highly privileged system processes. Highprivileged processes must enforce input validation to ensure that correct input is received
and correct actions will ensue from within the high privileged process. System kernels are
the highest of privileged processes. Inconsistent parameter validation renders a function to
execute with incorrectly validated parameters. Implicit sharing of confidential data is a
consequence of improper input validation, and has been countered by the developments of
mandatory access controls, such as labeling, and access decisions dictated by security
policy.

Asynchronous validation/inadequate serialization results in race conditions,
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deadlocks, and instantiation related coherency problems.

Inadequate identification,

authentication, authorization - without authorizations of a user or process, imply that the
system has no means to enforce control of the integrity of its own components, or to protect
the data of other users. Without identification and authentication, a system is incapable of
distinguishing either between separate users, or in tracing actions and upholding of
accountability policy. Lack of authorization control induces anarchy in system resource
management. Violable prohibition and limits to system data structures is vital; if these
structures and containers are overflowed, the system security state will transition from
known stability and security maintenance to unknown stability and security postures.
Exploitable logic errors lead to compromised security of a system [1].
2.1.3 Protection Analysis (1978)
Improvements in operating systems security were a concern in the 1970’s. This
study aimed to provide insight to operating systems developers to improve security
mechanisms. The study group focused on various protection errors, and methods of
identifying them. The classification was derived from a formulation of pattern matching
techniques to examine source code for security faults. Four broad categories of syntactic
structure were identified each having several types of security faults [6, 8]. The Protection
Analysis classification is shown in Table 2.3. The protection domain and validation error
classes are well understood and the vulnerabilities found by researchers and exploited by
tools are heavily oriented toward these classes. The synchronization and operator/operand
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error classes are somewhat less common today mainly due to the difficulty in detecting
them via external analysis and attack mechanisms.
Table 2.3 Protection Analysis Taxonomy
Error Class
Protection
domain errors

Elements
initialization and enforcement issues addressing initial assignments,
protection mechanism bypass, parameter change management,
naming ambiguities, incomplete destruction of data, content and
contexts
Validation errors considering boundary and operand tests, allowing pointer boundary
violations, and buffer overflows
Synchronization improper protection of atomic operations, and lack of blocking or
errors
barriers on sequences of operations
Operator/operand unfair process scheduling, use of incorrect operators and operands
errors
Protection domain issues remain problematic in common operating systems to this

day, although the “Orange Book” and Common Criteria address this as a requirement to
gain evaluated status.

Validation errors remain commonplace in software as input

validation and buffer overflows dominate vulnerability categories in BugTraq and CVE
descriptions.

Synchronization errors are addressed in parallel computing middleware

libraries, as well as system call libraries in modern programming languages.
Operator/operand errors can still occur if inadequate verification and testing is performed
on software.
2.1.4 IBM Orthogonal Defect Classification (1992)
Chillerege describes the intent of the orthogonal defect classification approach “The
goal is to provide an in-process measurement paradigm to extracting key information from
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defects and enable the metering of cause-effect relationships.

Orthogonal Defect

Classification (ODC) essentially means that we categorize a defect into classes that
collectively point to the part of the process which needs attention, much like characterizing
a point in a Cartesian system of orthogonal axes by its (x, y, z) coordinates”. This may be
interpreted to mean that the categories chosen must provide coverage of the domain.
Defects are grouped relative to the part of the process in which they are uncovered. The
classifications take into consideration: cause, evoked by a classification set of triggers, and
an effect class measured by severity. The effect classification used is IBM’s CUPRMID—
Capability, Usability, Performance, Reliability, Installability, Maintainability and
Documentation [13].
2.1.5 Landwehr et al. (1993)
Landwehr and his team of researchers observed that the history of software failures
was largely unpublished, yet system security was a rising concern. They worked toward
the goal of helping system designers and implementers produce more stable and secure
systems. The taxonomy was derived from analysis of the software development life cycle,
and consists of three broad categories [31]. Landwehr’s classification is shown in Table
2.4.
Table 2.4 Landwehr Software Failure Taxonomy
Axis
Genesis
Location
Time of introduction

Element types
malicious, non malicious
considers the type of software involved
pertains to product life cycle phases
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Within the genesis dimension, a malicious cause in the form of worms, viruses,
trap doors, time bombs, Trojan horses is possible. Non-malicious sources of vulnerability
include implementation error, a lack of requirements comprehension or collection, or an
implementer’s or maintainer’s misunderstanding of the design logic. Most non-malicious
flaws fit into domain errors, validation errors, or serialization/aliasing errors, errors from
identification/authentication problems, boundary condition errors, and logic errors. The
location in the system software dimension includes system routines, system support
utilities, or user programs. The time-of-introduction dimension includes requirements,
specification, design, implementation, incomplete testing, or maintenance phases of the life
cycle [31].
2.1.6 Aslam (1995)
Aslam’s intent was to classify faults unambiguously in software on UNIX operating
systems into non-overlapping categories, with the express purpose of populating a
vulnerability database and to identify fault detection techniques. This would lead to
systematic testing strategies that would improve success over that of the penetrate-andpatch paradigm. Vulnerabilities that led to system compromise were of primary interest.
Sources used were the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Security advisories,
various computer security mailing lists such as BugTraq at SecurityFocus [47], Security
Tracker [48], and literature surveys. Aslam’s classification is shown in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5 Aslam Taxonomy
Fault Class
Coding
Operational
Environmental

Element types
synchronization, condition, parameter handling,
installation
resource constraints, faulty construction, component interaction, or
event handling

The personal, communications, physical, and operations security related faults were
acknowledged, and omitted to bring focus to software faults. The categories in more detail
include operational faults concerning installation in the wrong place, installation using
incorrect parameters, and installation with wrong permissions. The coding faults include
synchronization issues of race conditions, event serialization, condition handing issues of
missing conditions, unspecified conditions, and missing predicates. Other coding issues
include limits being checked, access rights being checked, valid input values, correct
syntax, parameter matching, missing delimiters, extraneous input fields, subject origin
authentication, and checking of exception conditions. The environment faults include
limitations of environment resources and capabilities, faulty compilation or builds of
software products, interaction errors between functionally correct modules, and exception
handlers that do not perform as expected [6].
2.1.7 Bishop (1995/6)
Bishop’s intention was to develop a taxonomy through an examination of earlier
work.

In addition, through analysis of the results of the Protection Analysis work,

illustrated how to improve the security of systems. A second goal was to show how to
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write programs with minimal security related flaws. The taxonomy used the UNIX
operating system and supporting software and applications as the basis of study. Direct
benefits of the work included: a description of vulnerabilities in a form readily useful to
intrusion detection systems; an explanation of methods to identify vulnerabilities; and an
explanation of an approach to prevent exploitation of vulnerabilities in the system. The
taxonomy has six dimensions, each vulnerability being classified along all of them. The
resulting classification from Bishop is shown in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6 Bishop Taxonomy
Dimension
Nature
Time of introduction
Exploitation domain
Effect domain
Cooperating components
Source of identification

Element types
class of error
product life cycle phase
program, file, language
couplets {(user/system),(nothing, session, hardware)}
number of separate parts necessary
source code, news lists, papers, or security advisories

The nature of the flaw dimension includes domain errors, validation errors, naming
errors, and serialization errors. The time of introduction can occur during development,
maintenance, or operation of the software. The exploitation domain considers the software
program itself, related configuration files, or high-level command languages on the system
such as interactive user shells or web content rendering languages. The effect domain
considers the stakeholder and context relative to the system and is derived from couplets
wherein one element is either {the system, or user}, while another is taken from {nothing,
the session, applicable hardware, or a combination of session and hardware}.

The
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minimum-components-to-enable addresses whether the vulnerability can be exploited by
the single component or whether a group or chain of vulnerabilities must be exploited in
order to produce the vulnerable condition. The source of identification serves to trace the
understanding of the vulnerability to a known beginning, including software settings, news
lists, articles, papers, and security advisories [9, 10].
2.1.8 Du/Mathur (1997)
Du and Mathur described their research of the study of vulnerabilities registered
into the database built and maintained by the Purdue University COAST/CERIAS
Laboratory. A taxonomy was constructed, based on the cause of a flaw, the impact of the
flaw, and the repairs needed to render the system invulnerable to the exploitation of the
vulnerability resulting from the flaw. Motivation for the taxonomy included:
1. Evaluation of code based coverage criteria (control flow, data flow, and
mutation based criteria), in assessing the effectiveness of testing for
vulnerabilities,
2. Motivation to develop a tool to assist developers and testers in assessing the
effect of flaws in distributed software, e.g., Common Object Request Broker
Architecture (CORBA) [40], interfaces to distributed objects written in Java.
The Du/Mathur scheme allows a vulnerability to have membership in several
categories.

They state that restriction of a vulnerability to one category induces

information loss regarding the flaw [20]. The cause, impact, fix coupling is used [20, 40].
Du’s and Mathur’s resulting classification is shown in Table 2.7. The cause dimension was

18
adapted from the work of Landwehr et al. including validation errors, authentication
flaws, incorrect serialization, and incomplete boundary checking errors, domain application
errors, incorrect designs, and other exploitable logic [31].
Table 2.7 Du/Mathur Taxonomy
Dimension Elements
Cause
similar to Landwehr’s genesis
Impact
consequence of successful exploit – unauthorized access, execution,
modification, denial of service
Fix
spurious, missing, misplaced, or incorrect
The direct impact of the flaw dimension encompasses unauthorized execution of
code, unauthorized modification of resources, unauthorized access of resource, and denial
of service. The fix or remediation dimension utilizes DeMilo and Mathur’s classification
scheme since it is amenable to automation. This aspect examines source code for the
presence of spurious entities and their removal, as would be the case for characteristic sub
strings incorrectly specified. Additionally missing entities, misplaced entities and restoring
to their proper place, and incorrect entities are used as a catchall case [40].
2.1.9 Krsul (1998)
This taxonomy was developed to build a vulnerability database. The taxonomy
focuses on the assumptions made by programmers about the environment in which their
software executes; often these assumptions fail to hold true.

Krsul sought a deeper

understanding of the nature of vulnerabilities, and presented his taxonomy as part of his
Ph.D dissertation at Purdue University [30]. Three dimensions were identified. The threat
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dimension is concerned with direct impacts of vulnerabilities. Indirect impacts follow
from these as advanced vulnerability state transitions. An environment dimension and a
nature of vulnerability dimension were also included. Krsul’s classification is seen in
Table 2.8.
Table 2.8 Krsul Taxonomy
Dimension
Threat
Environmental
Nature of
vulnerability

Elements
unauthorized observation, creation, modification, destruction of data
or objects
assumptions about the properties of data and objects within the
system
impact on relationships between the objects, environment

The threat dimension pertains to the security of data or objects and includes
unauthorized observation of objects or data, unauthorized destruction of objects or data,
unauthorized modification of data or objects, unauthorized creation of objects or data. The
environmental dimension examines the surroundings of the data or objects. The nature of
vulnerabilities dimension examines the relationship between object, environment, and
affect.
There are four questions addressed and numerous decompositions arise from them.
The four questions concern the object affected by a vulnerability, the effect on the object,
the method used to affect the object, and the nature of the input resulting in the affectation
of the object. Affectation includes command prompts, user or system files, stack codes,
passwords, web sessions, net sessions, CPU time, and memory use. There are 34 elements
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in the nature of vulnerabilities dimension; a general sampling considers direct and indirect
impact. Direct impacts involve immediate results of vulnerability exploitation and include
change in availability, unauthorized disclosure, and misrepresentation of information,
repudiation of information, change in integrity, loss of confidentiality. Indirect impacts
refer to eventual effects of the exploitation, with intermediary steps or actions such as
access to external systems, elevation of privilege, internal system disclosure, external
system changes in availability, integrity, and loss of confidentiality.
2.2 Taxonomies of Faults
What follows is a review of work in efforts to classify faults in software; this work
relates to vulnerabilities because many vulnerabilities proceed from faults in executing
software. An understanding of faults can contribute to classification of vulnerabilities. In a
study of a real-time software system by Rubey, ten divisions of faults were identified [43].
Four divisions of faults were outside software functionality; these include incorrect
documentation that would lead to user-induced errors, variations of programming standards
that could lead to unpredictable behavior or performance, erroneous specification, and
deviation from specification where results may not be acceptable in customer acceptance
procedures.

The remaining six divisions pertain directly to software function and

performance [43]. Rubey’s classification is summarized in Table 2.9. Another study
conducted on faults found in a compiler for the TLR language was reported by Portier, et
al. The results were compared with two other studies. A cross section of the three studies
was measured against eight categories, listed here in decreasing frequency of encounter:
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logic errors, interface errors, data handling errors, data definition, I/O, computational, and
database errors [41].
Table 2.9 Rubey’s Software Fault Classification
Fault classification in software
Description Functionality
Incorrect documentation
x
Variance of programming standards
x
Erroneous specification
x
Deviation from specification
x
Erroneous data access
x
Erroneous decision logic and sequencing
x
Erroneous algorithms
x
Invalid timing
x
Improper interrupt handling
x
Incorrect definition of constants
x
A similar study conducted by Beizer [7], who collected statements from programs,
and analyzed results from four other researchers. He identified an aggregated sample space
of 2,070 faults. Based on these results, Beizer developed a taxonomy of the faults, which is
shown in Table 2.10.
Table 2.10 Beizer Software Fault Taxonomy
Dimension
Functional
System
Process
Data
Code
Documentation
Standards
Other

Elements
specification, operation, test
interfaces, devices, software, sequences
initialization, control, arithmetic, static logic
type, initial value, structure
source, libraries
installation, user instructions, administration
language, protocol
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The functional dimension includes the specification, test, and operation of the
software. The system dimension encompasses internal interfaces, hardware (I/O devices),
operating system, software architecture, system control and sequencing, and resources.
The process dimension considers the software process, performance, arithmetic,
initialization, control and sequencing, static logic, and allows for a catchall other element.
The data dimension addresses aspects of data type, initial value, and structure. The code
dimension examines faults (defects in this case) in the source software and included
libraries.

The documentation dimension covers installation, usage and administration

guidance provided for the user. The standards dimension is also included since standards
are often formulated by consensus (vendor-developer), sometimes a lack of clarity exists
which results in differing interpretation, and implementation of a standard. The taxonomy
also includes the other catchall category to include dispersed intangible causes of faults.
The functional and process categories contributed to over half of the defects, with the
specification sub category contributing the most [7].
These studies indicate that faults can be attributed to any aspect of system
development.

This shows that elimination of vulnerability in software products and

systems is a long-term goal. The IT community must be prepared to address vulnerabilities
in the products that they acquire. The various categories and dimensions can lead to an
elaborate classification system; however, the truly relevant aspects for system owners need
not span the full set of dimensions revealed in the literature.
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2.3 Taxonomy of Security Policy
Sparse work exists in the area of classifying security policies. Smith and Newton
developed a security policy taxonomy [50], and published it during the 23rd National
Information Systems Security Conference in October 2000. This taxonomy is based on the
ISO 15408 1999 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC)
[16]. The taxonomy was developed as an aid to CC Protection Profile developers who
must map the profiles to specific user community’s organizational security policy. The
taxonomy is derived from the Policy/Requirement Hierarchy (P/R) and follows from it.
The Smith and Newton security policy classification is shown in Table 2.11.
Table 2.11 Smith/Newton Security Policy Taxonomy
Class
Functionality
Assurance
Management

Element
security service provision areas
product, development,
procedures, planning, training

Within the CC, the functionality dimension considers the security functional areas
as opposed to product functionality.

The areas include confidentiality, integrity,

availability, authenticity, accountability, non repudiation, and generic system access. The
assurance dimension takes into account the extent of maturity of product behavior, stability
of the development environment and software development discipline that is exercised in
producing the product; areas include system/product assurance and developmental
assurance. The management/administrative dimension addresses the peripheral matters to
the product itself, yet form a critical link to successful use and deployment of the product.
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Such things as training, procedures, system use, system administration, and contingency
planning are considered. Smith and Newton stated plans to include extension of the
taxonomy to include the supporting Target of Evaluation (TOE) that addresses the Policy
Requirements within the CC framework [50].
2.4 Discussion of Metrics
Organizations seeking improvement need to know how well they are performing
each task, since this provides guidance for focus on refinement and in making investment
related decisions.

Profit motivated organizations favor investments that promise the

greatest return or reduce the cost of ownership. Government and Defense organizations
focus on compliance to numerous regulations and standards. Such regulations mandate
metrics programs to measure compliance; many are included in Starret [52]. Selection of
metrics requires care in that the choice of metrics may cause an organization to improve
only in those areas for which they can obtain a measure or a metric [28]. When examined
in another way, metrics do provide a basis of focus for the organization. This is true if an
effort to identify the optimal set of metrics is made. Additional data from excessive metrics
may distract, or even confuse, the decision makers by presenting too many options to
address or improve IA posture or behavior. This latter phenomenon is a form of paralysis
by analysis. Metrics programs ideally serve to guide the improvement process and measure
progress toward improving aspects of a given program. The active use of metrics should
follow a set of priorities that the organization can manage. They are most effective with
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regular and open communication, and all stakeholders should participate in the choice of
metrics [63].
In the area of vulnerability assessment, with new discoveries occurring daily and
the rate of new vulnerabilities doubling yearly for the past four years [17], one may
conclude that attainment of complete security is impossible. Within IA, there are few
published standards in these areas, although there is research ongoing in IA metrics. Work
in this area is summarized below.
2.4.1 The State of IA Metrics
Leading researchers in the IA field convened the “First Workshop in Information
System Security Scoring and Ranking” in 2001 to discuss the state and future of
measurement and metrics as applied to the IA discipline. Those in attendance agreed that
certain aspects are difficult to measure, but that measurement of those aspects that are
measurable should be done [25]. The participants summarized the problems in IA metrics
and measurement as non-uniformity in the understanding of metrics, metrics become ends
in themselves and lose value with the user/consumer and, metrics are reported in contexts
beyond their original intent. The purposes of metrics were divided into two general
classifications:
1. To aid in decision support, and,
2. To show a measure of progress in support of mandated reporting of such
progress.
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The tracks of the workshop also illustrate aspects of metrics. Technically, metrics
can be used to compare objects – algorithms, specifications, architectures, and other aspects
of a system life cycle. Organizationally, metrics can describe and track the effectiveness of
programs or initiatives. Operationally, metrics describe the risks to environments, and thus
assist in management of those environments. Two other areas for the use of metrics
include the ability to describe and assess expertise, and within the environment, metrics
describe the security relevant aspects of threats. Observations by the participants included
that in a technical sense, very little work has been done in metrics to describe and compare
products or technologies. The most rigorous works in IA pay little attention to metrics.
The US Department of Defense, Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) ‘Orange Book’ did not address metrics beyond the defined evaluation levels for products.
Its successor the (ISO IS) 15408 1999, Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation standard succeeds the TCSEC and provides narrative descriptions, but
does not incorporate defined metrics. The product development organization is free to
define them in the respective Security Target (ST) specification.

The workshop

participants agreed on the following uses of technical metrics:
1. They establish goals and measure how well the available technologies or tools
meet the goals,
2. They are most useful when the assigned value is valid for most of the product’s
lifetime,
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3. When used for predictions of performance, they must be based on a model of
IA in which values assigned are significant factors in system security; a counter
example of this is the fact that within the TCSEC framework when combining a
database and a system, each given a C2 rating, do not necessarily equate to full
C2 protection,
4. When used as predictors, must be based on a model where the future resembles
the past; a counter illustration is that a lack of discovery of vulnerabilities in a
product to date does not guarantee that none will be found. Data must be
collected without foreknowledge of how it would be used,
5. Respective communities use them differently. Government users are primarily
concerned with product ratings such as the CC and compliance issues, while
commercial users are concerned with implementing the overall risk
management process with less concern for sanctioned evaluation results [25].
Organizational metrics track the progress of success of an organization and its
implemented programs. Examples include the DOD’s IA Vulnerability Alerts (IAVA),
which are vulnerabilities encountered by DOD system administration personnel in the
course of their work [58]. Another metric is the percentage of trained or certified IA
personnel. Organizational questions include how well security concerns are identified, and
measurement of the effectiveness of vulnerability management programs. How well are
mandates being met [25]?
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Operational metrics describe and help manage risks and threats in the
environment. This study is concerned with this classification of metrics as they relate to
the detection and removal of vulnerabilities. Examples of operational metrics include risk
assessment metrics, and the associated component parts of asset value, impact severity,
threats, vulnerability, and effectiveness of security measures. Realistic metrics here include
the number of advisories or reported vulnerabilities repaired, the time spent in correction,
and testing of corrections made, percentage of systems remediated. The controllable
portion of the environment includes physical, procedural, and personnel related security
measures. A quantitative approach is described in the literature. The measures include
counts of vulnerabilities found, intrusions, or viruses detected. These measures do not
address readiness, nor do they adequately inform managers of violations in system security
policies. A need to monitor and track operational performance was also addressed at the
workshop. Product vendors must address this matter in presenting trend analysis and
supporting data for their products [25].
Conclusions from the workshop include:
1. No single metric is sufficient to quantify the assurance provided by a system,
2. Software and systems engineering are closely related to the assurance provided
by a product,
3. Penetration testing is in wide use as a form of metric. However, it is seldom
reproducible. It does provide value to organizations using it,
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4. Governmental and commercial users have different motivations, being policy
and profits focused respectively,
5. Measuring “defense in depth” is critical and warrants more research,
6. Metrics that incorporate processes, procedures, tools, and people will remain
critical, as all four of these aspects combined constitute IA within an IT
environment.
Metrics must also evolve with techniques and technology. Metrics must be updated
or replaced as objectives are met, and new ones are enacted to replace them, as this implies
that the nature and definition of progress changes. Better models of system behavior are
needed to develop predictive technical metrics.

Specific models of interrelationships

between subsystems are needed [25].
Another recent measurement initiative, developed and supported by the MITRE
Corp., concerns the unification of nomenclature for discovered vulnerabilities.

The

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) presents a cataloging system and basic
guidelines that IT and security product vendors are encouraged to adopt. The CVE evolved
from a vulnerability database forum at Purdue University. As of the April 2, 2003 release,
over 6,400 vulnerabilities are either formally accepted by the voting membership, or were
recognized as in candidate status – worthy of research and consideration. The CVE catalog
can be used as a basis to compare vulnerability scanners on a common footing. The CVE
catalog began in 1999, and thus shows that an average of over 1,300 vulnerabilities are
added each year, yet the rate of introduction of vulnerabilities doubles yearly [35].
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The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), with oversight and leadership
responsibilities in the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), instituted the IAVA
program. Within this program, vulnerabilities of concern to the DOD are announced, and
the respective IT staffs must remediate them to remain in compliance. Three severity
levels are described with the critical ones requiring less than one-month mitigation.
Vulnerability scanner vendors release updated signatures on a monthly, or more frequent,
interval [55].
The Systems Administration, Networks, and Security (SANS) Institute is an
organization of IA professionals that plays an active role in security education and
awareness. SANS sponsors numerous conferences, provides web based training, offers
certification in security and incident handling including their Global Information Assurance
Certification (GIAC) track. GIAC certification is sought after by corporations hiring
information systems security personnel. SANS provides links to many assessment and
measurement tools. Along with the FBI and international organizations, they publish a
yearly list of top vulnerabilities. Their 2003 Top 20 includes ten Windows and ten UNIX
categories, and all examples in each category are cross-referenced to the CVE catalog.
They co-sponsor the Center for Internet Security (CIS) [12], which also provides host
based assessment-scoring tools. Also provided is the Security Consensus Operational
Readiness Evaluation (SCORE) site, which includes numerous checklists and discussion
forums with leading practitioners within many system specific disciplines – Cisco®,
Personal Digital Assistants (PDA), Linux, and Windows® et al [45].
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The Dartmouth College Institute for Security Technology Studies developed a
certification suite for the 2000 SANS Top 10 vulnerabilities, and publishes results of those
products that have demonstrated acceptable ability to correctly identify the vulnerabilities
in systems against the SANS vulnerabilities [26].
We now address aspects of measurement in order to devise techniques for
determining the strength of IA tools, and to provide a framework by which an organization
is able to mark its progress toward a strong IA posture. There are several perspectives or
dimensions by which tools can be measured. The dimension of assurance level of the tools
including their life cycle management from requirements, through design, implementation,
testing, vulnerability assessment, maintenance, configuration management and quality
assurance practices of the vendor was difficult at best for a purchaser to determine until the
advent of the ISO 15408 1999 Common Criteria. Vendors can seek Evaluated Assurance
Levels (EAL) for their tools and developer capabilities in the areas of security function,
assurance, and management [16]. A vendor subjecting a product to this analysis shows a
desire to independently assess the product and demonstrate trustworthiness of the product,
and of their ability to support and improve it. Since thorough research into vulnerability
assessment, tool capability is costly for every potential stakeholder to undertake, many
choose to trust the informed opinion of security research wherever they can find it. A
review of research and literature related measurement and metrics of software product
quality follows. From this work the foundations for the use of metrics within IA and
specifically vulnerability assessment tools can be developed.
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2.4.2 The Properties of Useful Metrics
When we speak of metrics, there is an implication of a measurement system and a
baseline from which the measurements are taken, and evaluated. Metrics have quantitative,
qualitative, and purpose dimensions.

We examine each of these in this section.

Quantitatively, there are four general types of measurement scales in use: categorical,
ordinal, interval, and ratio. Categorical, (or nominal) scales are useful as classifiers (truth
and falsehood in logic), and are sufficient when equivalences are available or derived;
mathematically, category scales are equivalence relations [23]. Ordinal scales are useful in
establishing orderings; mathematically, they are linear orderings [23].

Ordinal scales

preserve the order of elements [64]. Interval scales are useful when comparing differences
such as temperature changes; mathematically, interval scales are an ordered Abelian group
[23]. Interval scales preserve ordering and differences between elements in the group [64].
The term Abelian refers to the results of Niels Henrik Abel, a Norwegian mathematician in
the early 1800’s, who independently developed the foundations of the branch of
mathematics known as group theory. A group exists under a binary operation (+,-,*, /)
when the four fundamental properties of closure, associativity, identity and inverse
properties hold. Abelian groups also satisfy the commutativity property (ab=ba). When
the group’s members can be aligned based on a ranking, the group is ordered. The fourth
measurement class is that of ratio scales, useful when comparing equality between ratios;
length and weight are common examples; mathematically, ratio scales are Archimedean
ordered fields [23]. Ratio scales preserve ordering, intervals, and ratios between elements
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in the group or field [64]. Fields are defined when the Field Axioms (commutativity,
associativity, distributivity, identity, and inverse) apply. Archimedean ordered fields have
the property of holding true for applications of Archimedes’ Axiom across all members.
Archimedes’ Axiom states that for members within a field (a,b,c,d): and scalar values m,
and n; for each of the inequality operators (<), >), and the equality operator (=), that if ma <
nb; then mc <nb, when m < n This holds for (<) and (=) also [64]. The measurements of
different IA properties can be mapped to one of these measurement scale types.
Categorical scales are useful for describing the state of applied security among systems; we
can describe each system as secured or unsecured based on our knowledge and testing that
the systems security protection meets established standards. A system with rigid password
enforcement, a full set of operating system and application patches, and minimal services
running might be an organization’s concept of a secured system. Ordinal scales are
commonplace in vulnerability assessment. The description of vulnerability severity used
by antivirus vendors, and security researchers in discussing severity of exploitations are
examples of usage of the terms high, medium, and low. Each vendor applies its own
criteria and descriptions to each of these terms. High might mean near certain likelihood of
being exposed to a virus, or to the ability to obtain system level privileges immediately
through exploitation of a flaw. Another example within ordinal classification is the rating
system such as 1-10. McClure, Scambray, and Kurtz employ this scheme in their book
“Hacking Exposed” to discuss the measures of risk rating based on popularity, simplicity,
and impact of an exploit [34]. Interval scales within IA relate to observances of measured
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quantities such as cumulative intrusion attempts detected within a period when compared
with a similar period in the past. Another example is the number of known patches not
applied on a given day, versus a previous day in the past. Such measures would provide
useful information on the relative security posture of the system or organization. Ratio
scales in IA would be useful for assessing the relative security posture between peer
departments or divisions, which may be of differing size and system compositions.
We must also reason about the definition of terms used in assessing security or
assurance such as the meaning of “secure” – or “assurance” in determining when a level of
sufficiency has been reached. This uncertainty determination is addressed in fuzzy logic
[65], which attempts to address uncertain classifications through the creation of an ordinal
or interval scale between categories.

Fuzzy set membership is one such example.

Intelligent, intrusion detection systems can be built upon fuzzy-ordered measurements of
degree of attack or anomaly [11]. Fuzzy measures are used to provide finer grains of
differentiation within ratio, interval, or in extreme cases, ordinal scales [28].
The science of measurement is consulted to provide direction in selecting or
constructing useful measures and metrics.

Properties of metrics have received much

attention in the Software Engineering discipline. A set of properties that also applies to
software products, such as vulnerability assessment tools, will help to provide the focus and
evaluation criteria for solid metric selections. Kitchenham, Pfleeger, and Fenton have
studied measurement in software engineering.

Their work treats the aspects of
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measurement by creating models of the measurement process. Among the rules they
suggest are these [29]:
•

Use measures that you understand in the context of your own goals or situation,

•

If you are concerned with multi-dimensional measures for attributes such as quality,
or complexity, use different measures for each aspect of the attribute,

•

Do not try to combine different aspects of an attribute into a single measure unless
you have a model or theory to support the combination,

•

If you measure different aspects of a multi-dimensional attribute and want to
predict some other attribute, use step-wise multivariate linear regression to combine
the attributes into a single predictive model. Using a stepwise algorithm ensures
that only aspects that contribute to the prediction are used in the model,

•

If you use a predictive model that is based on analyzing empirical data, be cautious,
as the model is unlikely to reflect a truth of nature.
A model of measurement consists of a unit definition, instrumentation, attribute

relationships, measurement protocols, and entity population. Entities are the subjects of
observation, and attributes are observable properties of entities. A measurement maps an
empirical property of an attribute to formal mathematical constructs.

Units refer to

denominations in measurement, e.g., temperature degrees can be in Kelvin, Fahrenheit, or
Celsius. Values refer to the members of each group or field within a scale as discussed
earlier. Values have permissible and non-permissible bounds, e.g., ordinal scale values
must be non-decreasing integers beginning at one. Instrumentation can vary with the units
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or scale in use – measuring tape vs. triangulation by position and radar range finding, and
can serve to classify an entity based on its mode of measurement, e.g., gender or Boolean
truth-value.
The Kitchenham, Pfleeger, and Fenton model also stipulates indirect measurement
as being valuable. An example is the use of size of a software product to reflect effort
expended to develop it. In vulnerability assessment, false positive frequency could be used
to reflect trustworthiness. Compound measures involve coupling simple measures into
ratios for sake of comparison, e.g., vulnerabilities found per machine scanned. This also
implies that indirect measures and compound measures must be based on a relationship
model of how the indirect measure relates to the attribute. Magnitude comparisons of
compound measures without a relational model would be meaningless.
Kitchenham, Pfleeger, and Fenton based their definitions of the components of their
measurement

model

with

models

of

each

component,

measurement

models,

instrumentation models, and entity models. They further developed validation methods for
each of the component models [29]. Schneidewind had previously done work on metrics
validation and related them to aspects of quality including association, consistency,
discriminative power, tracking, predictability, and repeatability. Table 2.12 explains
Schneidewind’s research in the context of quality measurement [46].
2.4.3 Applied Metrics and Measures
Practical work on implementation of metrics can be found in journals such as
CrossTalk, a journal of the defense software industry, and includes articles by leading
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software engineers working on defense projects.

Articles on specific metrics,

implementation of measurement programs, relationship to the Software Engineering
Institute’s Capability Maturity Model (SEI CMM), and discussion of tools are among those
published [54].
Having examined the quantitative aspects of metrics, and the micro level qualitative
aspects of metrics it is important to examine qualitative ones also. Qualitative properties
can be applied to macro and micro considerations. In the macro scale, we consider
combinations of metrics having different purposes to bring out a comprehensive assessment
of a tool or process.
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Table 2.12 Schneidewind’s Metrics Validation
Quality
Function
Quality
assessment

Scale

Method

Measurement
Property
Difference

Validity
Criterion
Association

Purpose of
Valid Metric
Assess
differences in
quality

Statistical Method

Interval

Parametric

Quality
assessment

Ordinal

Non
parametric

Higher/lower

Consistency

1. Rank correlation coefficient

Nominal

Non
parametric

High/low

Discriminative
Power

Assess
relative
quality
Control
Quality
(discriminate
between high
and low)

Quality
control

Quality
control

Nominal

Non
parametric

Increment

Tracking

Quality
prediction

Interval,
ratio

Parametric

% Accuracy

Predictability

All Quality
functions

Ratio

Parametric

% Success

Repeatability

Control
quality (track
changes)
Predict
quality

Ensure
metric
validated
with
specified
success rate

1. Coefficient of determination
2. HO population correlation
coefficient = 0.
3. HO: Population correlation
coefficient
4. Linear partial correlation
coefficient.
(metric normalization. Accounting
for size).
5. Population correlation coefficient
confidence interval.
6. Factor analysis (tests of
independence).

1. Mann-Whitney comparison of
average ranks of Two Groups of
components.
2. Chi-square contingency table for
finding critical value of metric.
3. Short-cut technique for finding
critical value of metric.
4. Sensitivity analysis of critical
value of metric.
5. Rrusal-Wallis Test of average
metric rank per given value of
quality factor.
6. Discriminant analysis (use of a
single metric’s mean as
discriminator).
1. Binary Sequences Test and
Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Test.
1. Scatter plot to investigate
linearity.
2. Linear regression.
a. Test assumptions
b. Examine residuals
3. Find confidence and prediction
intervals.
4. Test for predictability threshold,
and repeatability thresholds
5. Non-linear regression.
6. Multiple-linear regression.
. Test assumptions
b. Examine residuals
c. Test for predictability threshold
and repeatability threshold.
Ratio of validations to total trials
threshold.
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Regarding macro properties and qualities that sound metrics should possess, there
is a growing business in software metrics.

Software Research, Inc.

developed the

TestWorks Quality Index to address the relative quality of software products independent
of the process maturity of the software development process; static and dynamic
performance considerations are addressed. The TestWorks Quality Index criteria describe
the attributes of measures of quality. Among their observations is that no more than ten
factors should be considered in developing a comparative metric. Of these ten, Software
Research made the following recommendations for product evaluation metrics:
•

At least half of the factors should be quantitative,

•

At least three of them should address static measures,

•

At least three factors should be dynamic measures of the product,

•

At least one should address the product’s development process maturity,

•

At least one should address the quality need as addressed from outside – e.g., the
cost of repairing defects.

The criteria may address more than one factor within each metric as otherwise; this list
would easily exceed the ten prescribed [51].
Micro level qualitative properties are applied to individual metrics to understand the
overall quality of the resulting measure. A good list of such properties was discussed
during the workshop on Information Assurance Rating and Ranking discussed earlier. The
workshop’s list of attributes for metrics includes:
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1. Scope – the portion of the IA problem domain for a given metric should be
specified clearly,
2. Sound foundation – the metric should be based on a well-defined model of the
portion of IA that it represents,
3. Assessment process – the process for assessing the metric should be welldefined, repeatable, and reproducible,
4. Relevance – the metric should be of value to IA stakeholders,
5. Effectiveness – it should be possible to evaluate against the metric quickly and
with sufficiently low cost [25].
Standards oriented research into evaluation of software products also contributes to
technical assessments of IA tools. With the increasing emphasis placed by the software
consumer on its product providers following mature, repeatable, processes in order to
deliver trustworthy products, many organizations are striving for ISO 9000, and 14000
certifications or SEI-CMM-I certification. Punter, van Solingen, and Trienkins discuss the
state of this field in their paper, and apply the recommendations in ISO 14598, which
addresses evaluation techniques, and ISO 9126, which addresses the evaluation process.
Product evaluation supports investment proposals, when choosing among contending
options. The quality characteristics outlined in ISO 9126 include functionality, reliability,
usability, efficiency, maintainability, and portability. Each of these also has subclasses.
Security is addressed in the functionality section, and pertains to the security of the product
itself. ISO 14598 focuses on the evaluation process from several stakeholder viewpoints,
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with an entire document dedicated to each. The developer, acquirer, and evaluator
viewpoints each are considered in software product evaluation. The standard identifies
four phases of the evaluation: analysis, specification, design, and execution. Each phase
has unique meaning for each stakeholder. For the evaluator, the four steps are to define the
object of the evaluation, define the scope of the evaluation, document the evaluation
process, and perform the evaluation and capture results. The authors also discuss the
concept of levels of evaluation based on levels of capability or decomposition and detail of
processes. Their argument is that based on function or consequences of success or failure
of the software, some degree of choice can be made by the acquirer as to the extensiveness
of the evaluation and on the definition of pass or failure. This would allow medical
equipment control software to be evaluated with more rigor than would be needed for
office productivity sotware. This all leads to the definition of a ‘Quality Profile,’ that is a
specification of requirements to which an evaluation is coupled [42].
Many products are judged for acceptability on their ease of use, these judgments are
qualitative and subjective in nature, and this is likely to remain true. However, much
research has been done in usability evaluation methodologies. Zhang lists several [66].
Two such methods include an intuitive method, and heuristic evaluation [37], that can
readily be constructed into an ease-of-use metric. An empirical approach on usability by
Zhang, Basili, and Schneiderman also seems a reasonable approach [67].
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2.5 The Information Assurance Metrics Problem
The problem of IA metrics encompasses the security of the IT infrastructure from
initial requirements to decommissioning and replacement of components, and considers
policy, personnel, and regulatory, as well as technical aspects of performance of operations.
The assessment of assurance provided must consider the full product development process,
and such metrics should be developed, or adopted by each stake holding organization. The
ISO 9000/14000 and ISO IS 17799 and the SEI’s CMM and accompanying systems
security engineering (SSE-CMM) are all worthy of consideration. The Common Criteria
evaluation process also considers life cycle and product assurance measures in addition to
security functional performance of the product. Personnel and regulatory measurement and
metrics are also necessary. Metrics for the number of courses completed, certifications,
degrees obtained, or hours of training per IA worker can be established. The technical
components of IA include firewalls, Virtual Private Networking, anti-virus software,
intrusion detection systems, authentication tokens, smart cards, disaster recovery, highavailability components, vulnerability assessment software, system and network
management systems, and others. Each of these provides a measure of depth in the
organization’s IT defenses. The US Defense Department’s defense-in-depth strategy is
formulated upon this thinking [5, 58].
There are other areas in the operational and technical dimensions of IA, which have
had less formalism or rigor invested in their measurements. We have few metrics for the
strength or resistive ability of firewalls and authentication systems; other than password
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size, aging, and algorithm assessments. Just as each organization is different, and faces
different quantities of threats, there is a notion of a best-fit capability for each product or
technology within each organization. The study of metrics for goodness of fit for an
organization and its security policy has not been studied and documented.

Many

measurements are of a qualitative nature, yet use of such measures is better than use of
none, and experience with qualitative measures may lead to development of quantitative
ones [25].
Developing metrics for technical capabilities in vulnerability assessment as relating
to an organization’s specific security policy is the focus of this study, and any metrics
proposed will consider the full set of aspects within the IA domain. Vaughn, Henning and
Siraj proposed a taxonomy, shown in Figure 1 of IA metrics building on work and
discussions held at the earlier discussed “Workshop on Information Security System Rating
and Ranking,” and “Approaches to measuring security” conducted by the Computer
System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB).

This taxonomy addresses

metrics based on the division of organizational security, and technical capabilities. In our
study of vulnerability assessment tool evaluation metrics and models, the technical target of
assessment would seem to provide the guidance for the development of metrics and a
fitness model.

However, we should not overlook the areas of operational and

organizational assessment in the evaluation of tools. If a tool can distinguish itself as
organization or operations friendly, this could provide a very strong advantage for its
selection [59].
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Figure 1 IA Metrics Taxonomy
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2.6 Discussion of Vulnerability Assessment
To understand vulnerability, it is important to understand the contexts in which
vulnerability is discovered and exploited. Alford describes cyber warfare taxonomy [2].
McClure, Scambray, and Kurtz describe the taxonomy of a computer penetration [34].
Their classifications are similar.

Cyber-warfare is comprised of four stages: cyber-

infiltration, cyber-manipulation, cyber-assault, and cyber-raid. Generally, infiltration and
manipulation occur in sequence producing a state wherein either an assault, or raid or both
are possible [2]. The computer penetration taxonomy is more detailed and includes: 1.
Foot printing, 2. Scanning, 3. Enumeration, 4. Gaining access, 5. Escalating privilege, 6.
Pilfering, 7. Covering tracks, 8. Creating back doors, 9. Denial of service [34].
Table 2.13 compares system compromise models and is interpreted bottom-up. The
lowest levels are necessary to ascend to higher goals. These two classification systems
overlap as illustrated in the table, with cyber infiltration being comprised of foot printing,
scanning, and enumeration. Cyber manipulation consists of gaining access and escalating
privilege. From here, the cyber assault equals denial of service, while the cyber raid
equates to pilfering and covering of tracks. The creation of back doors is a step in
subsequent cyber manipulations. Cyber warfare pertains to incidents with a nationalistic
agenda, while cyber-crime pertains to a lack of a nationalistic agenda and the presence of a
financial or emotional agenda. Thus, exploitation of vulnerabilities in civilian systems is
cyber-crime whenever circumstances or consequences of such violate applicable laws.
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Table 2.13 Comparison of System Compromise Models
Cyber-warfare/cyber-crime

Cyber-raid
Cyber-assault
Cyber-manipulation

Cyber-infiltration

Computer penetration
Create Backdoor
Covering Tracks
Pilfering
Denial of Service
Privilege Escalation
Gain Access
Enumeration
Scanning
Foot printing

Additional definitions are now discussed which will assist in the discussion of
vulnerability and its remediation. Threat, risk, vulnerability, and exposure, are interrelated.
Vulnerability in the software context is a manifestation of software defects and faults,
wherein a fault with security compromising consequences is an active definition of
vulnerability. Security related deficiencies occur throughout the software life cycle: in
requirements or design, flaws are passive in nature and are referred to as defects within
software engineering literature. A defect introduced during design through implementation
is considered a fault if manifested at execution time. Faults with associated severe security
policy compromises are vulnerabilities, while those with less harmful, security policy
violations are exposures [35]. An exposure is a manifestation of software defects and
faults, which may result in a security policy infraction, or in the use of unnecessary services
that are exploitable to reveal information about the system.

Stated another way,

vulnerability is the property of a system forfeiting security when exposed to an attack, and
exposure is the increased opportunity of an attack.

Attacks can be intentional, or
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unintentional.

Threat is knowledge of the existence of a potential attack against a

perceived or known weakness (vulnerability) of a system. Risk is the estimated likelihood
of an attack against a known vulnerability. Residual risk is the calculated decision to
accept a less than complete remediation to a vulnerable condition.
The discipline of vulnerability assessment is growing. An article in Computer
Finance in late 2000 [18] projected a quadrupling in the vulnerability scanning market size
from 2000 – 2004. Reasons given for acquisition of vulnerability scanners include:
•

Ensuring that devices on the network are configured securely,

•

Checking for access privileges and excessive privileges,

•

Checking for the latest vulnerabilities,

•

Checking password strength,

•

Checking open accounts and accounts without passwords,

•

Testing unique environments,

•

Insuring security within all devices all the time,

•

Making sure that devices such as the firewall and IDS are secure,

•

Conducting OS detection,

•

Helping ensure security policy,

•

Mapping vulnerabilities along the network, and

•

Additionally, some vendor tools can be used in simulation mode, playing
the role of an adversary and launching denial of service attacks on the
network.
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The preceding list illustrates user expectations of vulnerability assessment
software. The previous models of system attack also highlight areas of concern and needs
for coverage by IA technology including vulnerability assessment tools. The leading tools
make claims of covering the critical vulnerabilities, and most indeed do address them in
general. The question for a tool user and security stakeholder is one of making the wisest
choice. The desire would be to have some concrete basis for making this choice, and a
means of finding the tool that best suits requirements. This leads to an examination of the
avenues by which measurements in vulnerability assessment can be performed.

The

process of vulnerability assessment measurement can be approached from several
perspectives. The approaches for IA measurement, and thus for vulnerability assessment,
can be divided along five sets of axes:
1. Objective or subjective: the average number of vulnerabilities found per month is
measurable; the knowledge needed to operate a tool is more subjective. However,
subjective measures are more common in IA,
2. Quantitative or qualitative: the number of vulnerabilities found by a tool is a
preferable measure, while the opinion on a relative scale, such as 1-5 of a tool is
less desirable,
3. Dynamic or static: dynamic metrics are preferred since the goals of an organization
change as it matures, and the nature of IA itself changes with time.

Many

penetration-testing measures are dynamic, as is the percentage of known
vulnerabilities fixed per month.

Static metrics include those taken at regular
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intervals pertaining to policy or compliance- e.g., security refresher course
completion by IT staff,
4. Absolute or relative: absolute metrics need no basis for comparison – the number of
nodes licensed for a product. Relative metrics rely on comparison e.g., the raw
number of vulnerabilities says little of the IA posture, while the relative severity
and number at each severity level adds much to the IA posture,
5. Direct or indirect: direct IA metrics can be generated from observing the property
that they measure; the number of invalid packets rejected by a firewall over a
certain period. Indirect IA metrics are derived by evaluation, as is the purpose of
the Common Criteria, or assessments of attributes such as risk. Although direct
metrics are preferred, it is not possible to measure directly. In these cases, indirect
measures are useful [60].
.

In principal, the mission of vulnerability reduction is to identify software with

vulnerabilities, identify a repair process, and verify that the repair was successful. There
are many steps that contribute to these goals. Given that we must identify vulnerabilities,
we then determine a method to detect the evidence of a vulnerability. Accompanying this
is the need to remove the likelihood of misidentification (avoid false-positives) and to
ensure that no vulnerability is overlooked (prevent against false-negatives). We must
present the severity of the vulnerabilities and illustrate potential abuses and consequences
of successful exploitation. This dimension is also relevant to the output of the vulnerability
assessment tool. Another aspect concerning vulnerability assessment is the criteria used in
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determining whether a vulnerability exists. One viewpoint, vulnerable software, is that
the mere existence of software or settings known to be associated with a vulnerability
renders the vulnerability as real. The second viewpoint, vulnerable configuration, concerns
the actual runtime state of the system. In this view, the presence of known vulnerable
software is not a concern if this software is inactive at the time of analysis. Thus, a
question arises: is the severity rating of a vulnerability based on potential since the
vulnerable software exists, and it could be exploited, or is it based on more exact measures,
such as the given service or process associated with vulnerable software was found running
at the time of the assessment. The acquirer of vulnerability assessment software should
seek the answer to this question from each candidate vendor, to understand how
vulnerability is treated, and whether this view is acceptable for the acquiring organization.
Other considerations in evaluating vulnerability assessment tools are considered
here. It is also important to provide an identifiable catalog or cross-reference information
in order to compare results of tools. In repairing a confirmed vulnerability, the tool must
provide a well-defined and repeatable process for performing the repair and provide interim
solutions, if patch availability is unknown. The repair must define sufficient steps to
prevent ambiguity or improper repairs. For each repair made, it is important to ensure that
the correct patch is applied. This is assured given that a means for verification that the
repair has been successful exists.

This can be done by retesting for the original

vulnerability, or it can be an independent confirmation from an outside source, using a
different tool, or in difficult cases, a hand-on-mouse, visual inspection of settings.
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Contemporary information security publications conduct comparisons in the
interest of educating IA consumers to make good choices. Several reviews have been
published, with varying opinion of the best tool. In the reviews, there has been no
consensus choice as best; this is evidence that the current popular measurement process for
such tools is not reproducible. Examination of the details of the reviews also illustrates this
fact. In addition, the content of reviews of vulnerability assessment tools shows that a
more rigorous treatment of such IA metrics is needed. In the comparison of system
vulnerability scanning tools, the results to date are high level and subjective in nature. Two
recent examples are in a January 2001 product comparison by Network Computing
magazine [22], and a November 2001 review by NetworkWorld Fusion magazine [3].
Each evaluation tested tools in assessing against pre-configured systems with a selection of
vulnerabilities and assessed the competing products in their use and ability to identify the
list of vulnerabilities, made other observations such as timing, and indicated whether repair
information was provided.

The NetworkWorld Fusion review emphasized 17

vulnerabilities by which products were scored, although their systems had many more than
this. A scoring sample of 17 vulnerabilities is statistically small, and unreliable as a
product quality indicator. It should be noted that the vulnerabilities selected were good
choices that a worthy tool should identify. Measurements in these reviews included time to
complete a scan and number of vulnerabilities found.

The respective vulnerability

signature databases were measured, as was ease of use, and number of false-positive
returns. The false-positive count is a valuable consideration because elimination of these
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greatly enhances usability and value of a tool, as well as increasing user confidence in its
accuracy. The Network Computing review was more representative of a professional
environment, although their inclusion of antiquated Red Hat Linux version 5.2 diminished
their results, as versions 6.2 and 7.0 were in widespread use as of the research and
publication dates [22]. In December 2001, the NSS Group, a professional computingsecurity testing laboratory in the United Kingdom published comparative results of five
commercial vulnerability scanners, and provided a much more rigorous testing regimen.
Among the criteria accounted for by NSS is this partial list: tool architecture, installation,
configuration, reporting, and, analysis.

In June 2003, Network Computing published

results of vulnerability scanner comparisons, which illustrated many vendor offerings over
a wide range of vulnerabilities. Tool features were examined, and shortcomings noted.
This survey utilized the Mitre CVE catalog [35], which makes it more repeatable.
Categories of reporting, coverage, performance, management, and price were assigned
arbitrary weights and tabulated. The results show that the popular press continues to
monitor the VA tool quality [38].
In the NSS Group study, vendors wishing to have their tools evaluated completed a
questionnaire.

The supplied answers to questions were taken into a qualitative

consideration. The NSS Group’s Question categories include:
•

Architecture (client/server, use of remote agents),

•

Whether a central control console is provided for distributing of scanning
agents,
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•

Documentation,

•

Minimum system requirements,

•

Protocol layer at which it operates (TCP/IP, Ethernet),

•

Whether specific packet drivers are necessary,

•

Whether authentication is done,

•

Management of policies,

•

Number of vulnerability signatures provided,

•

Systems supported by product,

•

Whether the administrator can customize scan criteria,

•

Nature of attacks performed,

•

Frequency of updates,

•

Can updates be scheduled,

•

Are results immediately available during scans,

•

Nature of solutions provided: advice, patches, automatic repairs,

•

Integration with other products,

•

Nature of reports provided,

•

Can scans be scheduled,

•

Integration with IDS tools,

•

Licensing matters, and

•

Pricing.
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Given this information, the evaluation is conducted and accuracy is validated both
against the provided answers, and against the known state of the targeted network of
systems. As for results published, the focus was on raw number of vulnerabilities found,
and on the time spent obtaining the solution [39].
All of these comparisons used a predominantly qualitative testing and relativistic
comparison of product assessment. This can be useful only if there is also an absolute basis
from which to measure product strength. The number of vulnerabilities found is not always
an absolute measure due to frequent occurrences of false-positive results. A challenge
exists in constructing an absolute basis. The real purpose of any product comparison and
analysis metric is to help each stakeholder in IA obtain the most effective solution for their
environment.

Utilizing a vulnerability classification framework that considers all

computable aspects of information systems security policy can serve to establish an
absolute basis. No existing framework completely does this, as was shown in section 2.3.
This study will build on work of Vaughn, Henning, and Siraj [59] to produce such a
framework from which a baseline can be constructed and tailored to a specific environment
and policy constraint. This baseline will provide each stakeholder the opportunity to view
their security policy as a whole, and to select those parts that are essential for coverage by a
candidate IA vulnerability scanner. This will assist in devising complete, well-reasoned
standards and requirements for a candidate tool. Once the standards and requirements are
established, candidate tools can be assessed for goodness of fit.

55
The question of the impact or severity of a vulnerability is also universally
unanswered, however every vulnerability analysis vendor provides a very user friendly
rating scheme: that of the high/medium/low rating. The CERT Coordination Center has
also developed an ordinal metric for many common vulnerabilities. Their numerical rating
is based on answers to these questions [17]:
•

Is information about the vulnerability widely available or known?

•

Is the vulnerability being exploited in the incidents reported to the CERT/CC?

•

Is the Internet Infrastructure at risk because of this vulnerability?

•

How many systems on the Internet are at risk from this vulnerability?

•

What is the impact of exploiting the vulnerability?

•

How easy is it to exploit the vulnerability?

•

What are the preconditions required to exploit the vulnerability?
This list illustrates a big picture view of severity, which the CERT/CC must

undertake. Their severity assessment should be a strong factor in the estimation of severity
for a local site. To this factor, the local site must assess the degree of reliance they have in
the system or software subject to the vulnerability. An obvious example of this is that a
Microsoft-only organization would place a very low weight on Sun Solaris desktop tool
vulnerabilities.
2.7 Remediation Taxonomy
Another area of study, which has relevance to the evaluation of vulnerability
assessment tools, is the understanding of vulnerability life cycles and aspects of repairing
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vulnerabilities in systems. Remediation strategies for vulnerabilities and exposures are
considered here. As discussed earlier, vulnerabilities and exposures are consequences of
faults. Fault remediation can be viewed in the sense of prevention of their entering the
system, removal during the design through integration testing phases, and corrective
maintenance during the operational portion of the system’s life. Vulnerability tools are
used during the operational phase of the life cycle, thus are a subset of corrective
maintenance. The Common Criteria refers to vulnerability related corrective maintenance
as the flaw remediation process [16]. Operational remediation can take the form of an
update, patch, workaround, or nothing.

Additional considerations must be made for

associated side effects or trade-offs in applying remediation measures. Impact can be none,
partial loss of functionality, or full loss of some functionality, such as would be the case
when disabling a vulnerable service. Another possible outcome of remediation is the
introduction of another vulnerability, also of concern is whether the remediation effort
succeeds in removal of the original vulnerability. The level of effort in cost, time, and
impacts on service are also important variables [33]. A vulnerability assessment tool’s
solution set will provide valuable insight into these options and consequences.

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The hypothesis under investigation by this study is that it is possible to quantify
strength of vulnerability assessment scanning tools (VAST) given that a sufficiently
discriminating set of measurable attributes is found.
The collected set of discriminating measures will comprise a best-fit model for
finding the most appropriate VAST. In this chapter, we explain the methodology used to
construct the metrics based fitness model. We begin with the IA metrics taxonomy
developed by Vaughn, Henning, and Siraj [59], which categorizes aspects of the IA
problem for which measures are needed and possible. The goal for a best-fit metrics model
is to include in it, a minimal set of measures spanning the categories defined in the IA
metrics taxonomy that show distinctions in one tool over the field of contenders, and
reduce common denominators in VAST properties. It is useful to note that metrics are
made up of comparisons or dimensions of measures. A measure is a simple, single
dimensional quantity, while metrics can be combinations of measures. Most available
vulnerability assessment data has been compiled through measures. It also makes intuitive
sense that some classification areas within the IA metrics taxonomy have more importance
than others do. The most important functions of a VAST are the correct identification of
vulnerabilities, and the presentation of effective remedies for them. Once tool common
denominators are identified, it is imperative to an acquirer to find measures that when
applied show distinction between the tools. All VASTs find hosts, illuminate open ports
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and list vulnerabilities in targeted systems.

Discriminators of breadth, speed, and

accuracy are important measures. Many other parts of the IA metrics taxonomy address
concerns of the organization and overall IA discipline. The VAST must also be assessed in
its coverage of these areas.

These areas present a broad opportunity for finding

discriminating measures.
Our model derivation methodology for the best-fit IA metrics model for VAST
follows the steps below.
1.

The IA metrics taxonomy by Vaughn, Henning, and Siraj [59] is used as the initial
classifier for measurement requirements.

2.

Existing measures and desired traits are collected.

3.

The collected measures are mapped into the IA metrics taxonomy.

4.

Frequency of occurrence of measures from all sources is noted as this gives us a
broad based view of the importance of each measure; this also facilitates weighting
in the model.

5.

A representative measure is selected from each area from within the taxonomy –
forming the best-fit model. The measure that best represents the scope of the
category is selected for inclusion.
Next, having a candidate model, we must validate it in a lab setting. Broad

capability and single-system focused testing is needed to address the user concerns of
breadth, depth, and accuracy.

The remainder of this chapter discusses the model
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construction. The model validation is discussed in chapter IV, and the Appendix presents
all measures taken during the study. Steps taken in validating the candidate model are 1.

Representative VASTs are identified and configured.

2.

A set of target systems are set up as prime subjects of the tools in the study.

3.

All assembled measures are taken on representative VASTs.

4.

In-depth assessment of the results of the tools is done to determine the tool’s
accuracy of detection. Accuracy is validated by independent analysis by systems
and security experts, and by analysis resulting from running the Center for Internet
Security’s CIS Level 2 Benchmarks [12].

5.

The metrics model is validated against the in-depth results.

3.1 IA Metrics Taxonomy
As mentioned earlier, IA metrics classification work has been undertaken as a result
of findings of IA workshops on metrics [25]. Vaughn, Henning, and Siraj published an IA
metrics taxonomy that decomposes the IA discipline into categories.

The high-level

decomposition was presented in Figure 1. The taxonomy makes highest-level divisions on
Organizational security and Technical Target of Assessment (TTOA). Most studies of
tools of any sort focus on the technical properties and base comparisons on measured
observations of performance. Note that in the case of VASTs the number of vulnerabilities
found is important, however this by itself deserves a closer look.
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Table 3.1 IA Metrics Taxonomy within Organizations
Metric Class

Purpose for VA Tool in the Organization

Policy management
Process maturity

assess compliance to policy
security improvements with time (trend
analysis)
are certified tools employed, Common Criteria,
ICSA, et al
required skill level of tool user needed.
tool cost of ownership, cost per month
amount of password, audit, permissions,
groups, extraneous services, found
extent of exposure to threat or attack, shows
open ports, services, and discusses severity
system auditing configuration
overall vulnerability analysis, and remediation,
support for community vulnerability catalogs –
CVE, DoE CIAC, CERT/CC Advisories,
Military/DoD IAVA compliance reporting,
SANS/FBI consensus vulnerabilities (Top 20)
detection of malicious codes, evidence of
system intrusions (worm, virus et al)
vulnerabilities found, Presentation of
vulnerability and its solution, Instant Fix
support
penetration tested, reported vulnerabilities in
tool, Independent vulnerability testing of tools
performance of a tool under stress or during
and after an attack against it
availability of tool resources to unauthorized
users, consequences of inadvertent erroneous
use – scans or fixes
breadth of targets supported, scalability,
performance, network impact of use – load
imposition, disruptions

Personnel support
Resource support
Operational practice
Operational
environment
Management readiness
Technical readiness

Effectiveness
TTOA features in
normal circumstances
TTOA adversary work
factor
TTOA survivability
TTOA risk

TTOA operational
limitations

Table 3.1 summarizes the IA metrics taxonomy from the perspective of
contributions that a VAST can make toward an organization using it. VAST’s contribute
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greatly to organizational security policy whether by direct impact of detecting and
reducing the vulnerability and threat of exploitation, or by indirect impact of assessing
compliance to policy or regulations.
Table 3.2 IA Metrics Taxonomy Properties of Tools
Metric Class

Properties of VA Scanning Tool

Policy management

tool has checks for areas of policy, password,
audit, permissions, groups, extraneous services
certifications tool has attained, ICSA,
Common Criteria
steps from launch to scan
extra database (SQL Server), Interoperable
with other infrastructure components
tool can be tailored to operational practices –
policy oriented settings available
tool explains meaning of results, Number of
checks available for Exposures
tool can be tuned to audit practices
extent of support for community vulnerability
catalogs – CVE, DoE CIAC, CERT/CC
advisories, Military/DoD IAVA compliance
reporting, SANS/FBI consensus vulnerabilities
(Top 20)
tool finds intrusion evidence, offers solutions
tool/developing organization provides
guidance documents, wizards, knowledge base
to users
independent published results of penetration or
vulnerability analysis exists
how does it handle loss of database
does tool make host vulnerable
special requirements for hosts or targets

Process maturity
Personnel support
Resource support
Operational practice
Operational
environment
Management readiness
Technical readiness

Effectiveness
TTOA features in
normal circumstances
TTOA adversary work
factor
TTOA survivability
TTOA risk
TTOA operational
limitations
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Table 3.2 uses the same set of metrics classification and depicts properties
(examples) of characteristics that can be measured for each category.
3.2 Collect Candidate Measures
In this section, we present measures that have been used by product reviewers,
acquiring organizations, and security experts. There is a good body of past work on which
to draw these measures, and many measures are common across all groups. This will be
illustrated by frequency counts for respective measures [3, 22, 38, 39, 56, 68]. The
measures are presented in tables 3.3 – 3.9. The Frequency column in the tables reflects a
count of the sources that included the respective measure. A range from 0 – 6 is possible.
We added measures to map to IA metrics taxonomy categories which were not included in
the prior 6 references. Such measures have a count of 0 as none of the cited sources used
it. The union set of all measures in this study forms an ‘at-large’ set, we use this term to
refer to all measures in the remainder of this document.
The emphasis here is on collecting properties and measures that the security
community has used, and map them into the IA metrics taxonomy to determine whether
there is room to broaden and improve upon the measures taken in the evaluation of VASTs.
Measures from a broad spectrum of sources were collected and classified within the IA
metrics taxonomy. In addition to popular product review measures, properties desired by
customers are included. Customer assessment data from large government organizations
are represented. A third source is from professionals within the security community, who
have used a large number of tools in their work and who gave input as to the properties
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needed most. The full range of measures is mapped into the IA metrics taxonomy. Not
surprisingly all groups cite some similar measures, while other measures are important to a
few acquirers. This enabled the accretion of a large set of candidate measures. The tables
3.3 – 3.9 focus on each class of metrics from the larger IA metrics taxonomy and show
frequency counts for measures that intersect among the groups of tool evaluators. The
tables group the metrics by their respective higher-level category (Figure 1) where possible.
The frequency column refers to number of occurrences of those cited above that included
this measurement within their product comparison or requirements list. Few measures
appear in all cited sources. Our intention is to select measures that represent the intention
of the category from the IA metrics taxonomy.
Table 3.3 IA Program Development Measures
Metric Class
Policy management

Frequency
2

Process maturity (tool developer)

0
0

Types of VA Tool Measures
password guidelines – aging, lockout,
audit
certification of tool (EAL)
process maturity of vendor (CMM)

Policy management metrics (Table 3.3) are specific to development of a security,
policy, implementation of policy, and compliance with policy. They can be supported by a
VAST by enabling the given policy to be encoded within the tool to identify areas out of
compliance. Identification and authentication of users is a common policy area, as is
access control of resources by users. This includes permissions lists, and appropriate time
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of day or days to be using the resources. Other areas defined in the policy should be
reviewed when considering a VA tool.
Process maturity metrics (Table 3.3) assess security-engineering activities that span
the life cycle of secured systems deployed by organizations. Examples here include the
Common Criteria, that measures process factors of systems by ranking them in one of the
seven evaluation assurance levels (EAL’s); primarily by examining the artifacts of the
development process [59].

In our context, the VAST does not assess its owner’s

organization processes; we look at the properties and qualities of the tool developing
organization. It applies to known development processes used to develop the tool, and any
related certifications that consider process maturity of the vendor in the evaluation process.
The Common Criteria [16] does make this consideration. The process maturity rating of a
vendor gives the customer of the tool documented evidence that problems or requests of the
vendor will be dealt with.
Table 3.4 Support Measures
Metric Class
Personnel
support

Resource
support

Frequency
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1

Types of VA Tool Measures
tool training offered
documentation
user certification
technical support
vendor responsiveness
tool costs, maintenance
price
speed
supplier health (P/E ratio, market capitalization, revenue
growth trend)
value (weighted vulnerabilities found)
cost is not important
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Personnel support (Table 3.4) addresses the people within the organization and
their level of competence.

Properly trained and certified IA professionals are better

equipped to maintain and improve the IA health of their organizations. Our interest
concerns the availability of training and certification of users of tools and the metrics
address the impact that the introduction of this tool into the workforce would have upon its
personnel, and the rest of the organization. The user certification category pertains to the
issuance of certifications of competence by the vendor or group for use of the tool. Vendor
responsiveness relates to the potential lag time involved in taking matters of personnel
support or problem resolution to the supplier and obtaining redress for it.
Resource support issues (Table 3.4) are concerned with direct material, financial
and indirect human impact of using the tool. Resource support metrics serve as indicators
of financial support within the organization, and available resources for IA programs and
processes. The tool’s price regulates the quantity of the tool that can be acquired. Tool
speed determines work output from it per unit time. Supplier health addresses the potential
for a long term relationship and experience base to be built between the user and supplier.
The value measure can take on many forms, looking at the vulnerabilities found (or
solutions per critical problem offered) per unit of money may shed interesting perspectives
on the tool suitability. Company accounting practices such as overhead charging practices,
depreciations, labor rates, should be included when making this measure to ensure that all
pertinent factors are included.
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Operational practice (Table 3.5) addresses the typical behavior of the organization
regarding IT security. It is important that members of an organization understand and
comply with security policies. The tool should be able to assess compliance rates by users;
examples include password compliance, and workstation security settings analysis.
Table 3.5 Operational Practices Measures
Metric Class
Operational practice

Frequency
1
3
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Types of VA Tool Measures
data management/mining/navigation
update mechanisms, updates (automated, monthly)
update handling
installation, operation, ease of use
assets can be rated for risk
support
schedulable assessments
notification of scan completion
access to product knowledge base
links provided for more info
deployment scalability
users/roles defined
multiple organizations supportable
policy distribution and changes
scan progress monitoring
supports ticketing/remediation management
logging
audit support

The ease and ability to distribute the tool and its updates is also considered in this
measurement area, as this affects the ability to measure compliance in larger distributed
organizations. If the organization performs regular audit trail reviews, the tool must be able
to support this practice. A second dimension of operational practice is in aiding in the IT
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security day-to-day practices. Tool update handling, distribution, role definitions, scan
progress monitoring are all useful features for evaluating IT operational practices.
Operational environment measures (Table 3.6) describe and measure the security
relevant aspects of the operational environment (i.e., external threats, conditions, objects)
that affect the organization’s security operations directly or indirectly. An example might
be number of systems susceptible to a specific penetration technique [59]. Therefore, the
ability of a tool to summarize the list of machines susceptible to a given vulnerability
would be valuable.
Table 3.6 Operational Environment Measures
Metric Class
Operational
environment

Frequency Types of VA Tool Measures
3
command line automation
1
3

exposure and visibility of environment to attackers –
inside and out: ports, services, related vulnerabilities
host vulnerabilities

0

platform options

3

network mapping, asset identification, annotations

2

GUI attributes/behavior/usefulness

3

can harm network (DoS attacks), Impact on network and
hosts (DoS, loading)
architecture (host/network based, agents, consoles,
database)
integration with IDS/firewall/VPN, console, integrate
with data management software

3
3

Operational environment (Table 3.6) has a second dimension addressing the impact
to the IT infrastructure from use of the tool. Will agents be installed on each machine; can
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the tool integrate with other security tools in building a defense in depth strategy? Does
the tool allow for asset identification and management? What types of vulnerabilities will
the tool find? Will it disrupt operations in doing so? Will it trigger alarms in the intrusion
detection system, rendering superfluous analytical time ferreting out false intrusion alarms?
Management readiness (Table 3.7) addresses the commitment of management to IA
processes within the organization. Thus, its measurement addresses the ability of the tool
to support organizational or domain-wide vulnerability remediation behaviors and provide
reporting.
Table 3.7 Readiness Measures
Metric Class
Management
readiness

Frequency Types of VA Tool Measures
2
detect audit behavior aging, audit data review and
practices
2
storage, activity, are scans saved in a database
4

Technical
readiness

1

reporting abilities Reporting (flexibility, diversity, ease
of use, exporting,)
trend analysis

1

incident handling

1

forensics

4
2

support of organizational vulnerability management
(IAVA, SANS, CERT, etc). CVE Support
automatic signature updates

2

automated remediation extent

Forensics support, vulnerability trend watching, and incident handling characteristics are
also considered in this area. The tool can assess audit configuration, examine use or
presence of forensics tools, and can be assessed for its support to remediation.
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Technical readiness measurement (Table 3.7) addresses the readiness state of
technical support that affects the organization’s ability to provide information assurance
while performing operational missions. These measures can be static or dynamic. Risk
assessment and vulnerability analysis are examples of static technical readiness
measurements [59].

The US Defense Department and military services issue alerts,

bulletins and technical tips under their respective information assurance vulnerability alert
(IAVA) program. Compliance to these alerts and bulletins is mandatory. Health care
professionals must be concerned with compliance to the health insurance portability
accountability act (HIPAA). Along with compliance profiles, reporting must be flexible
and diverse to support the compliance programs. The tools that support the well-known
readiness assessment efforts of the private sector (CERT Advisories, SANS Top 20), and
governmental (CIAC, Homeland Security FedCIRC, IAVA) provide ready value to users.
Tool vendors who address public policy such as HIPAA and Gramm-Leach-Bliley
financial behaviors demonstrate understanding of the complex impact of these laws on
organizations subject to them.

On the active side of technical readiness is the

responsiveness of tool suppliers to provide updates for disclosed vulnerabilities.
Tool effectiveness (Table 3.8) is concerned by addressing IT threats relative to the
managed environment. Basic areas of vulnerability detection and remediation along with
detection features for malicious code agents are considered. Metrics for the efficacy of the
organization’s IA program providing defense in-depth assurance are considered here.
Examples include the number of malicious code incidents (measures protection), number of
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intrusions reported (measures detection), and percentage of data recovered after a security
incident (response). This area is the stock and trade of IA professionals and is given great
treatment in public and academic literature. This area is also among the most important to
the organization as far as VAST technology is concerned.
Table 3.8 Tool Effectiveness Measures
Metric Class
Effectiveness

Frequency
3
2
1
5
0
2
3
0

Types of VA Tool Measures
password strength
intrusion attempts, malware detection
analyzes wireless devices
vulnerabilities found vulnerabilities (found, unique,
false-positive, false-negative)
remediation features (retest, undo, automated, )
vulnerabilities checked entries in database
customizable checks
quality of solutions given

During this study, a vulnerability in the Microsoft remote procedure call (RPC)
functionality and its integration with the distributed common object model (DCOM) was
disclosed. Microsoft® Windows® uses the RPC mechanism extensively for provision of
network-based services. DCOM is one such network-based service allowing applications
to share a common messaging and computing framework. The effectiveness of the vendors
as they handled the release of patches from Microsoft, and new exploits from the security
research and hacking community was tracked, and recorded in the Appendix.

Such

incidents give insight into the potential for a vendor to provide rapid response to critical
vulnerabilities in software.
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Table 3.9 Technical Target of Assessment Measures
Metric Class
TTOA features in
normal circumstances

Frequency Types of VA Tool Measures
0
certification level of tool
0

features (number, usefulness )

2

network (mapping, monitoring, port scanner,
password checker, c2 security
editable configurations

2
4
2

service packs, shares, hotfix ordering, Trojan
horse detection, web server and browser analysis
result view can be sorted, views configurable,

2

scalability and performance

1

system tool access

1

solutions provided really work

TTOA adversary work 4
factor
1

service on non standard location

TTOA survivability

0

resistance to corruption,

0

data preservation.

0

known or discovered vulnerabilities,

5

tool supports vulnerability discovery and repair,

2

crash network/devices, lockout users,

1

scans complete,

2

inter component authentication,

3

vendor is known,

3

evaluation copy available.

2

infrastructure coverage,

1

requirements for use,

2

alerting,

2

report combinations,

2

system privilege required,

1

tool supports interaction while scanning,

1

scans can be paused,

1

source code available,

3

Compliance to standards.

TTOA risks

TTOA operational
limitations

the tool has been analyzed for vulnerabilities
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The measurement area of technical target of assessment (TTOA) features in
normal circumstances (Table 3.9) is concerned with day-to-day use and maintenance of the
tool, and using the tool for day-to-day information assurance preservation. These metrics
measure the capabilities that the TTOA should have in order to provide information
assurance under normal circumstances.

They can be used for assessing the claimed

features of a TTOA [59]. This area differs from effectiveness discussed earlier in that
capabilities and potential of the tool are considered here.
TTOA adversary work factor (Table 3.9) considers the performance of the tool
under more hostile conditions. Adversary work factor is the amount of effort an adversary
spends in order to compromise protective measure(s) of a system. It not only incorporates
technical factors, but also personnel and operational factors [59]. Questions measured here
include has the tool been subjected to independent vulnerability analysis to point out
possible avenues of exploitation or misuse? This area also addresses whether atypical
configurations in the environment can be supported, such as scanning for web servers on
non-standard TCP ports. This latter measure considers detection of vulnerabilities when
the organization has taken steps to inhibit penetration from attackers. In addition to hiding
well-known services, such defenses as disabling registries and limiting file shares are
commonly done. Tools that require this resistance to be lowered may introduce a risk that
the defenses will not be fully restored after use.
The measurement area of survivability (Table 3.9) considers the resiliency of the
tool to tampering or inadvertent configuration errors. Questions asked in devising metrics
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include are resources such as registry keys or databases protected? Are instructions
available for locking down the tool if the installation process does not perform this service?
What happens if components of the tool such as databases are modified or moved prior to
use?
TTOA risk measures (Table 3.9) are those that measure threats, vulnerabilities and
associated risks to the TTOA. A full treatment of risks to products would be beyond the
scope of this study, however much can be learned from independent analyses of the product
in question. There is a secondary question on risk to the organization concerning the tool.
Can the tool be evaluated with little or no cost of time or money? Have any vulnerabilities
been published concerning the tool itself? This may indicate issues in software design and
reliability. If several components are deployed how is their inter component authentication
treated? The reporting of vulnerabilities in a tool does indicate a modest attempt at
independent analysis, however, it also points toward potential additional problems.
The operational limitation of a tool (Table 3.9) is the last measurement area.
Questions sought by such metrics include, how much of the infrastructure is covered by the
tool? What is required of the user and host system prior to and during use? How are alerts
handled during use? Can the tool be multi-tasked during scans? Is there evidence that the
tool supports existing standards in software or security? Are there limitations in reporting
from the tool, such as limited formats or report options?
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3.3 IA Metrics Best-fit Model
Until now we have mentioned various measures used in the discussion and
comparison of VASTs. In the goal to derive a metrics model, we must construct metrics
from the available measures, where metrics are the composition functions of two or more
measures. A metric of two measures such as bytes per second is a simple metric. Complex
metrics are composed of three or more measures to assess a property that is meaningful in
the context of one’s goal. The goal in selection of a VAST is to find the best tool for the
job when considering factors that are influenced by the tool’s choice within the
organization.
The derivation of a best-fit metrics model for evaluation of VAST was undertaken
using the IA metrics taxonomy of Vaughn, Henning, and Siraj [59]. Additionally, intuitive
guidelines from the problem of vulnerability assessment are introduced. Metrics properties
following from the work of Kitchenham, Pfleeger and Fenton [29] below are consulted in
defining the nature of metrics to include in the model. Their guidelines built on work by
Schneidewind [46] who discusses validation of metrics and appropriate metric types in the
areas of quality assessment, quality control, and quality prediction. This model contains
quality assessment and quality prediction aspects. The list below summarizes the metrics
selection and validation goals comprising the VAST IA best-fit metrics model hereafter
known as the model.
•

The model must contain only measures that are repeatable and reproducible,

•

The model must contain measures that are not complex to apply,
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•

The model must contain measures that reveal distinguishing traits of tools, yet also
allow a single tool to be distinct,

•

The model must contain measures from each measurement area from the IA metrics
taxonomy derived by Vaughn, Henning, and Siraj [59]. A secondary goal of this
study is to validate this taxonomy within the IA discipline,

•

The model must contain measures that are meaningful in the context of our goals,

•

When plausible, measures in the model must also be consistent with concerns and
dimensions measured by preceding comparisons and analysis,

•

The model must place prudent weightings on each represented measure, and be
amenable to variances of priorities of the user. This is so, since each user has
distinct configurations, and remediation priorities,

•

If a measure is valid in more than one IA metrics area, this measure should be given
greater weight, and earliest consideration,

•

The model must be practical and usable.
The aversion to complex metrics will encourage the model’s use, and will facilitate

reliable validation of results. Given the above criteria, we now present the list of measures
to constitute the best-fit model. The table below maps the single measure and its IA
Metrics classification, along with the weight given to this measure. The weights range
from one to three, with three being most important. Rationale for the choices follows the
table below. These metrics will illuminate crucial aspects of vulnerability discovery and
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remediation. This process will serve to place relative significance to the elements of
vulnerability assessment.
3.4 Map Model to IA Metrics Taxonomy
In section 3.1, we summarized measures that have been used to measure VAST
attributes and showed factors that large organizations have used in making purchase
decisions. We then set out to study whether additional measures were possible and map
them into the IA metrics taxonomy.
The union set of results of this search for metrics and measures resulted in the
creation of an at-large set. This at-large set was compiled during this study and analysis of
the respective tools and their features.

Table 3.17 shows the IA metrics taxonomy

categories along with questions that one would ask in seeking metrics for the category.
The Weight column serves to distinguish between the categories in the extent of influence
that each has over the selection of a tool. The range in values is from 1 – 3, with 1 being
lesser in influence. After identifying the field of measures and the list of tools to apply
them, we then identify the short list of measures that we will show is able to predict a tool’s
performance. The performance data is then presented to validate the list of measures.
The purpose of VASTs is to identify vulnerabilities in targeted systems; this also
includes finding evidence that the system has evidence of an intrusion, such as a worm.
Note that this is a slight overlap with anti-virus tools, which track all known and detect
properties of many unknown malicious codes.
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Table 3.10 IA Metrics Best-fit VAST Model
IA Metrics Class
Policy
management
Process maturity
Personnel support
Resource support
Operational
practice
Operational
environment
Management
readiness
Technical
readiness
Effectiveness
TTOA features in
normal
circumstances
TTOA adversary
work factor
TTOA
survivability
TTOA risk
TTOA operational
limitations

Measurement Questions
find the extent that the tool is configurable for password,
audit, accounts, user rights, security options, ACL
settings, IP security, encrypted data recovery assessments
is the tool certified under the Common Criteria
Determine if the vendor teaches classes, and additionally
certify user competence
determine the cost per class C network
see if the tool perform an organizational or domain-based
password compliance measurement
Determine if the tool allows for the likelihood of
disruptions to environment in full feature usage
Determine if the tool assess audit trail support and review
practices – age of audit log, logging settings
Illuminate the extent of support for vulnerability
cataloging (CVE, SANS, CERT, BugTraq, CIAC,
FedCIRC, IAVA)
determine the tool’s measure of evidence of intrusion or
system compromise
analyze and record the vulnerabilities found. unique
found in designated target systems. determine quality of
solution by examining the steps to solution (patch and
non patch solutions)
Determine how much can non-privileged users do with
the tool
Record what happens when one removes the
vulnerability database before or during the scan
find out if published vulnerabilities exist for tool in past
year
count the range of targets covered

Weight
1

1
1
1
2
3
1
1

3
3

1
1
1
1

Many worms can be detected by superfluous files or registry keys and VA tools
should be able to find these. The IA metrics taxonomy addresses the organizational,
personnel, as well as technical component of information assurance. Since all are essential
to a solid IA discipline, there is a need to consider impact to each of these components in
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IA tool selection.

The weights assigned are intended to guide the examination of

additional factors.
3.5 Test Environment
The target environment consisted of a full range of systems from Microsoft®, Sun
Microsystems, Hewlett-Packard, Red Hat, and Mandrake, plus a Cisco® router, and
printers from HP® and Tektronix®. One hundred and one systems comprised the whole
environment for the tests. Tool quality is also evident in the details presented, thus, a
patched and un-patched system running the operating systems Windows® 2000, Solaris 8,
and Red Hat Linux 8 were selected. The environment represents core systems used in most
organizations. Note that each system was one version off from the latest series from each
represented vendor. This was done to ensure higher vulnerability counts and show greater
effects of keeping systems patched. There are many other device types to consider such as
routers, switches, printers, and wireless access points. The study considers how many of
these types are supported, but none of them are studied in depth. The test network
however, contained a router, switch and 3 printers. Vulnerabilities found on these target
types are noted in the test results.
3.6 The VA Scanning Tools as Articles of Measure
Having the candidate measures, a set of tools was chosen in order to validate this
choice of measures. This research focuses on identifying useful measures that one can
employ in choosing the most desirable tool for the environment. The emphasis is on
setting expectations for use of the tools and finding measures covering the areas of IA, and
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measures for the most important performance factors of the tools under consideration. In
the category of VASTs, the discovery and effective remediation of vulnerabilities are
significant performance factors. Other factors are of less significance, but also must be
considered. Four tools were chosen for this research due to the availability of these tools
and due to the large number of measures to be taken and validated. Most acquiring
organizations will narrow their options to three or four candidates and select the most
desirable.

Each selecting user will have differing viewpoints and needs to consider.

Examples are:
•

The number of unique vulnerabilities found. (this accounts for duplicate
entries),

•

Effectiveness of solution; is a solution given for vulnerabilities that are
identified? Is sufficient information provided to apply a solution? Does the
solution repair the problem? How much time or how many steps are
necessary to apply the solutions presented, based only on information
provided?

•

Accuracy of vulnerabilities found. What is the false-positive rate? Is there
a false-negative rate?

•

Installation; is the tool easy to install? Is sufficient information provided for
resolving problems encountered during installation?

•

Performance, how quickly can the tool obtain results? What network load
is imposed? Are any of the tests disruptive or dangerous?
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•

Costs, what are the tool and maintenance prices? What is the estimated IT
overhead price? Calculate solutions per dollar, and vulnerabilities found per
dollar.

3.7 Measurement Protocol
Each tool was run in a controlled environment, without other tools executing on the
host machine. The network activity was measured with background data rates of about
1Kbit/second. The full set of output was captured in the most technical report offered by
the tool. The results were evaluated for accuracy in representing the known vulnerabilities.
Static analysis of the tools involves examination of documentation to learn about
features offered, extent of help available, restrictions of the tool, frequency of updates,
available reports, size of vulnerability database, and others. The tool’s database was
queried for several words that indicate the type of vulnerabilities covered and use of words
indicating an understanding of the IA discipline. One note is that three of the tools have
readily searchable Microsoft® Access databases, and one used scripted plug-ins. The
tool’s interface is used for searches whenever possible.

CHAPTER IV
VALIDATION
In this chapter, we derive a best-fit model as a predictor of vulnerability assessment
scanning tool (VAST) quality and suitability for the acquiring organization given that
sufficient consideration is given to the whole IA posture of the organization. As stated
earlier, IT staff resources in many organizations are stretched to extent that may not allow
full and complete tool testing. The level of familiarity and expertise with vulnerability
assessment varies widely. Thus, a model is needed that can quickly indicate reasonable
choices of tools. Tool quality can be measured in range of capability testing and singlesystem focused testing to address the user concerns of breadth, depth, and accuracy. Work
by Schneidewind [46] suggests that quality assessment measures and metrics would be
most appropriate in tool quality comparisons.

Ordinal and categorical measures are

reasonable choices for differentiation assessments. The primary goal of this study is to
select a minimal set of metrics that when combined, identify distinctions in contending
options for VASTs. In this study, we selected four tools: three are commercial offerings
and one is from the Open Source community. The tools are mentioned here once by name
and afterward by a randomly chosen letter. This study will not endorse any given tool but,
rather help to point out a suitable metrics model to assist VAST acquirers in obtaining the
best available tool. We use the term ‘available’ since the organization may be unable to
afford the best tool for their purposes.
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4.1 Selection of VA Scanning Tools
The tools used in the pursuit of a best-fit metrics based model for VASTs include
the eEye Digital Security Corp’s Retina® Scanner version 4.9.x [22]. Many releases of
this were used during the study period. A second tool from Internet Security Systems is
ISS® Scanner version 6.2.1 with several Xpress® Updates installed during the study [27].
It should also be noted that ISS released a version 7.0; however, this version was not
available during the study period.

The third commercial scanner was that of Harris

Corporation. Their STAT® Scanner version 5 was used with several updates during the
study period [24]. The Open Source tool used was the Nessus Scanner, versions 2.0.5 and
2.0.7 with many plug-ins added during the study. Nessus also has a Windows® based
client, NessusWx version 1.4.4 which was used [36]. This client was chosen since the
commercial tools only ran on Microsoft® Windows® operating systems. From here
onward in this study, the tools will be known as Tool A – Tool D, in no particular ordering.
The anonymity of the tools is preserved from explicit mention. It should be noted that this
work was done, in part using the above tools provided by the Harris Corporation STAT®
testing laboratory.
Having selected tools, we must also define the stipulations under which the model
is employed. The technique discussed in this study can be adjusted to fit any given
environment and user community. The presumed VAST acquirer is responsible for proper
security functionality of a general purpose IT infrastructure. The largest parts of the
infrastructure are the workstation and server collections; however, printers, routers, and
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wireless access points normally are also present. The acquirer is responsible for all aspects
of maintaining the network and therefore exercises care to minimize downtime in handling
maintenance. The acquirer is assumed able to install and run the tools without outside
assistance, however insufficient time exists for them to know the tools thoroughly. Thus,
default tool configurations are employed unless noted during the discussion of measures
and metrics. The acquirer will also hand the operation of the tool off to IT staff for
continual use and infrastructure maintenance. Reporting to executive management on
vulnerability status is also expected of the acquirer of the tool.
Each of the tools was configured to use all vulnerability checks that do not cause
harm or disruption to the network. This was done to preserve the integrity of the lab
environment and to observe the extent of safe checks in the tools. Efforts were made to
level the tools as much as was feasible and to give each tool the optimal environment and
opportunity to identify flaws safely. Background bandwidth measurements were taken in
90-second samples with the Ethereal protocol analyzer residing on the scanning tool host
machine. Ethereal was chosen due to being available in win32 form for the Windows®
based host platform, and in Linux for the open source tool scanning from a Red Hat® GNU
Linux™ platform. Ethereal version 0.9.12 and 0.9.13a were used as we attempted to
maintain currency and consistency in measurement. Most of the lab environment was
switched at 100 M bits/second; however, some 10 M bit/second hubs also existed. The
background bandwidth was consistent at .1 M bits/second before and after the tests. Each
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tool was tested on the same day and against the target machines configured identically.
Reboots of the scanning hosts were also done between tool tests.
4.2 Target System Selection and Setup
In order to address as many features of the tools as possible tests were run against a
collection of 101 machines representing HP® and TekTronix® printers, Cisco® router,
Microsoft® Windows® systems from Windows® 95, 98, Me, NT 3.51, 4, 2000, XP, and
Server 2003. Non Microsoft® systems included Sun Microsystems Solaris® version 2.5.1
– 9, Red Hat® GNU Linux™ versions from 6.2 – 9, and Mandrake® GNU Linux™
versions 7.2 – 9.1, and one HP-UX 10.20 system. Many environments also include
wireless access points; however, the portion of the lab available for the tests did not include
a wireless access point. Scans of the entire network were done with each tool. To assess
concerns for accuracy and enable more fine-grained analysis, two systems each of three
operating systems were set up. One of the pair was installed in a default configuration off
original CD media, while the other was installed off original CD media and all current
patches were installed through the day of testing. This test-bed allowed one to see the
strengths and weaknesses of each tested product. The fine grain test environment consisted
of Microsoft® Windows® 2000 Server systems, one installed in a default configuration,
and a second system, containing the latest service packs and patches, along with other
recommended settings such as security templates, and advice from the Windows® 2000
benchmark from the CIS organization [12]. In addition to the Windows 2000 systems,
Sun Solaris® systems and Red Hat® GNU Linux™ systems were also configured
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following the steps for the Windows® systems above. The Solaris® and Red Hat®
Linux™ systems were configured from default installations and a counterpart system was
patched with vendor provided security patches.

The Solaris® and Linux™ CIS

benchmarks were run on one each these patched target systems.

This configuration

provided bounds for the candidate tools to illustrate the inventory of detections and
solutions available from each tool, and provided an opportunity to determine falseidentification rates against systems secured. This created a diverse test set.
4.3 Measurement
All assembled measures, both in the best-fit model and in the at-large set were
taken on representative VASTs. Times were recorded from the tool output, available
debugging trace logs, and from the system event logs as applicable to each tool. Searches
for terms and checks were done through the tool’s interface, as well as through the
Microsoft® Access ‘Find’ feature. Three of the tools provided Access formatted databases,
while another provided access to data that is not included in the tool’s Access database.
The same terms are used and are noted in the test descriptions. Wireless coverage was
addressed through vulnerability check searches through the vulnerability check inventories.
Note that none of the tools remained static during the test period, thus several tests were
run on updated versions of the databases. The updates were done within a 15 minute
window with random orderings as to which is updated first and last. This was to alleviate
last minute; just in time, signature update queries from the tool update sites.
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4.4 Analysis
Tools were run against the six designated machines discussed earlier, as well as
against the full test lab environment. In devising measures, we decomposed the analysis by
considering results obtained from scans of the designated targets and looked for broader
capability indicators from looking at the full lab scans.
4.4.1 Depth Analysis
We consider the depth analysis first as this will reveal the number and quality of the
vulnerabilities found. This also allows us to study the recommended solutions to determine
if sufficient information exists to eliminate the vulnerability. Organizations evaluating the
tools are likely to possess wide ranges of familiarity with vulnerabilities; some will need
very little solution guidance, while others will need systematic advice.
The first aspect studied was the raw number of vulnerabilities returned on our test
machines. We examined the number of these found that the tool identified in its highest
risk category. The first consideration of an administrator is to remove the highest risks
from the system. When seeing a large number of vulnerabilities one is faced with the task
of prioritization. The results of running the tools on the Windows® 2000, Red Hat® Linux
8, and Sun Solaris® 8 systems individually appears below. Following this assessment, we
will select a vulnerability from each operating system and assess the solution that the tool
prescribes. Table 4.1 below summarizes the single machine scan findings, showing the
number of vulnerabilities found, by each respective tool.

The split horizontal
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accompanying cell shows the number of vulnerabilities rated as high using each tool’s
assessment criteria.

Table 4.1 Vulnerabilities Found and the Portion of Highest Risk
Total/High Vulnerabilities

A

B

C

D

Total

High

Total

High

Total

High

Total

High

Default Win 2000

236

13

90

12

67

6

146

76

Patched Win 2000 #

22

4

29

2

14

1

16

1

Default Red Hat 8

88

21

6

0

26

2

4

2

Patched Red Hat 8

10

0

14

0

59

4

14

2

Default Solaris 8

88

22

38

6

94

20

34

14

Patched Solaris 8

10

0

35

3

101

22

38

16

In the table 4.1 we observe some interesting trends in the data from the scan results.
The measure shows Tool A finding the most vulnerabilities in default installed and non
patched Windows 2000 systems, however Tool D finds a disproportionate number of them
rated high; almost 2:3, the other tools all show ratios of 1:6 through 1:10. If the Windows
machine is patched and the registry service turned off, the results show Tool B finding the
most vulnerabilities, and Tool A indicating more high risks than do the others. The patched
Windows 2000 system runs SQL Server 2000 Desktop Engine software, which was not
patched; all of the tools identified this lack of patching SQL. The measures show Tool A
to be patch oriented as is seen in the un-patched system scan results. Turning off the
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Remote Registry showed a radical drop in ability of all tools in the list. Tool A found more
vulnerabilities in un-patched vs. patched Solaris® and Linux systems, confirming it to be
patch–centric. Tool C seems to excel in Solaris® and GNU Linux™, but also does well in
Windows. Tool D would be of mild concern to a fastidious administrator by flagging
numerous high’s on patched machines.
We will now examine the criteria used by the tools in rating a vulnerability as high.
We examine the output in the reports. Tool A provides a legend on its highest-level
management report indicating that a high rating is assigned to granting system privileges to
a successful attacker. Examining several descriptions in the other tools indicates that Tool
B will rate the ability to execute code on a remote system, regardless of context, as high;
even if the victim has low privileges. Tool C also rates remote system code execution as
high regardless of victim privileges. Tool D adds susceptibility to remote denial of service
of a system as a high vulnerability. This expanded definition of high probably explains its
greatest number of high ratings in its scan results.
The preceding raises the point that tool suppliers do not have a uniform rating
system, but all agree that remote code executions are of high concern. An administrator
may want to sort out the consequences with more distinctive ratings. The enterprise or
domain context may be a useful guide, or at a minimum, all tool suppliers should define
their interpretations for what consequences entail high, medium, and low risk. This study
indicates that this is not being done today.
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Another concern for users of VAST technology is the possibility of false-positive
indications from the tool. The table below indicates a summary of false-positive returns for
the tools when run against patched systems. This analysis excludes indications for open
ports and statements that a given service (correct or incorrect) was running, and
concentrates on incorrect vulnerability renderings for correctly patched software.

Table 4.2 False-positive Results on Patched Systems
Total and High Risk False-positives A

B

C

D

Total

High

Total

High

Total

High

Total

High

Win 2000

0

0

3

1

2

0

0

0

Red Hat 8

0

0

0

0

1

1

6

2

Solaris 8

5

0

2

1

8

6

7

5

Tools that make assessments based on reading of service banners (“banner
grabbing”) and general tests to see if services are running are susceptible to over
generalizing on vulnerabilities. This is done in order to draw attention to patching and
adjusting settings on the detected services. The numbers in table 4.2 were also included in
table 4.1 earlier. Every false-positive result found would require time for the administrator
to make a visit to the machine and examine it for actual settings.
An examination of the nature of false-positive output is also useful to understand
areas of strength and weakness in vulnerability collection and analysis. In table 4.2 above,
Tool A’s results were found for superceded package versions of the Java environment on
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the system. Tools C, and D generalized on Sendmail vulnerabilities. Sun’s Sendmail
banner is not similar to the Sendmail.org variant, which was used as the assumption. Tool
B was incorrectly assessing Apache services on Sun, and Internet Explorer version 6
service pack 1 on Windows systems. Understanding the areas where false-positives occur
can help an acquirer decide if the occurrence of specific types of false-positives is
acceptable.
We next examine solution guidance for the tools. The following example uses an
SQL 2000 vulnerability reported by three of the tools. The vulnerability occurs in the
Microsoft® SQL 2000 Server Resolution Service. This vulnerability was chosen due to the
importance of database servers to organizations having them, and because patching of the
SQL Server is a complicated process. Most Windows® patches are downloaded, and
installed, followed by a system reboot. The problem description and solution texts have
been sanitized to remove evidence of the supplying vendor.
Tool A:
Description: SQL Server 2000 and Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE)
2000 introduce the ability to install multiple copies of SQL Server on a
single machine and have it appear that the copies are completely separate
database servers. These copies, known as instances, run independently of
each other. The default instance listens on TCP port 1433. Other instances
cannot share this same port and require a port of their own. When a SQL
client needs to connect to an additional instance on the SQL Server, it
queries the SQL Server Resolution Service (which operates on UDP port
1434), which tells it which port the requested instance is using.
A vulnerability result because a pair of functions offered by the SQL Server
Resolution Service (SSRS) contain unchecked buffers. By sending a
specially formatted request to UDP 1434 port, it could be possible to
overrun the buffers associated with either of the functions. An attacker
could cause portions of system memory (the heap in one case, the stack in
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the other) to be overwritten. Overwriting it with random data would likely
result in the failure of the SQL Server service; overwriting it with carefully
selected data could allow the attacker to run code in the security context of
the SQL Server service. The Slammer (Sapphire) SQL worm takes
advantage of this vulnerability. The worm sends 376 bytes to UDP port
1434. The worm continuously sends packets to randomly generated IP
addresses, attempting to send itself to hosts that are running the Microsoft
SQL Server Resolution Service. This causes a denial of service on the host
on which it is running, as well as on the hosts to which it is attempting to
connect. The worm resides in memory, and not on disk, so it can be
eliminated using a system reboot or shutting down the SQL server and
restarting it.
Remediation: Install the SQL Server 2000 Security Update for Service Pack
2 or SQL Server 2000 Service Pack 3.Using a web browser, navigate to
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;enus;Q316333&sd=tech and download and install the
00.0686_enu_installer.exe file (MS02-061 patch). This will install a new
version of sqlservr.exe and ssnetlib.dll. If you have ssnetlib.dll with a
version of 2000.80.636.0 or later, you are patched. Note: You must have
SQL Server 2000, Service Pack 2 installed. This service pack is available at
http://microsoft.com/sql/downloads/2000/sp2.asp and you will need to
reboot for the patch to take affect. SQL SERVER 2000 SP3 INSTALL Using
a web browser, http://microsoft.com/sql/downloads/2000/sp3.asp and
download and install the latest SQL Server 2000 Service Pack. To verify the
service pack has been loaded, run the command SELECT @@VERSION
from the SQL Server Query Analyzer window. The version should be 8.760
or greater. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base articles
Q316333, Q323875 and Microsoft Security Bulletins MS02 039 and MS02061. Also see Mitre CAN-2002-0649.
Tool B:
Description: Microsoft SQL Server 2000 is vulnerable to multiple
vulnerabilities, which are addressed in the patch released with Microsoft
Security Bulletin MS02-039. The most serious of these vulnerabilities would
allow a remote attacker to execute code on the system
Remediation: Apply the appropriate patch for your system, as listed in
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-039. See References
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Tool C.
Description. The remote host MS SQL server is vulnerable to several
overflows which could be exploited by an attacker to gain SYSTEM access
on that host. Note that a worm (sapphire) is exploiting this vulnerability in
the wild.
Remediation:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms02-061.asp
Risk factor : High
CVE : CAN-2002-1137, CAN-2002-1138, CAN-2002-0649, CVE-20020650, CAN-2002-1145, CAN-2002-0644, CAN-2002-0645, CAN-2002-0721
BID : 5310, 5311
Tool D:
Description: There are three security vulnerabilities here. The first two are
buffer overflows. By sending a carefully crafted packet to the Resolution
Service, an attacker could cause portions of system memory (the heap in
one case, the stack in the other) to be overwritten. Overwriting it with
carefully selected data could allow the attacker to run arbitary code. The
third vulnerability is a remote DoS.
Remediation: Install Service Pack 3 for SQL Server 2000 from Microsoft.
Tool C lumped several vulnerabilities in one check, but contained a consistent CVE
reference, as did the other tools. The other tools each found additional vulnerabilities in the
server and treated them with the same respective levels of explanation.
We also looked at an Apache™ vulnerability on Red Hat® 8 GNU Linux systems.
There were actually 3 vulnerable conditions reported by Red Hat.
Tool A:
Description: Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered within the
Apache web server.-ModSSL improperly negotiates for an upgraded
SSLCipherSuite resulting in the use of the weaker version of the
SSLCipherSuite.-Denial of Service condition can be invoked by client when
a proxy ftp connect request is sent to an FTP server that is utilizing an IPv6
address.-A temporary Denial of Service conditions occurs during the
handling of accept() errors. CVE's covered by this vulnerability: CAN2003-0192, CAN-2003-0253, CAN-2003-0254
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Risk: Medium
Remediation: Before applying this update, make sure all previously
released errata relevant to your system have been applied. To update all
RPMs for your particular architecture, run: rpm -Fvh [filenames] where
[filenames] is a list of the RPMs you wish to upgrade. Only those RPMs
which are currently installed will be updated. Those RPMs which are not
installed but included in the list will not be updated. Note that you can also
use wildcards (*.rpm) if your current directory *only* contains the desired
RPMs. Please note that this update is also available via Red Hat Network.
Many people find this an easier way to apply updates. To use Red Hat
Network, launch the Red Hat Update Agent with the following command:
up2date
This will start an interactive process that will result in the appropriate
RPMs being upgraded on your system. If up2date fails to connect to Red
Hat Network due to SSL Certificate Errors, you need to install a version of
the up2date client with an updated certificate. The latest version of up2date
is available from the Red Hat FTP site and may also be downloaded
directly from the RHN website: https://rhn.redhat.com/help/latestup2date.pxt Bug IDs fixed (http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla for more
info):
78019 - mod_ssl won't start up after unclean shutdown
82985 - Content-length miscalculated when using ssi include virtual with
wrapped cgi
85022 - Apache fails to start: Cannot create SSLMutex file
97111 - httpd insists on always calculating Content-Length from CGI
output.
98545 - Handle errors when starting piped logged processes
ftp://updates.redhat.com/9/en/os/i386/mod_ssl-2.0.40-21.5.i386.rpm
Tool B did not discover this vulnerability on the date tested.
Tool C:
Description: The remote host appears to be running a version of Apache 2.x
which is older than 2.0.47. This version is vulnerable to various flaws
which may allow an attacker to disable this service remotely and/or locally.
Remediation: Upgrade to version 2.0.47
See also : http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/CHANGES_2.0
Risk : Medium
CVE : CAN-2003-0192, CAN-2003-0253, CAN-2003-0254
BID : 8134, 8135, 8137, 8138
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Tool D:
Description. A vulnerability was reported in the Apache 2.0 web server. The
server may apply a weaker encryption suite than intended.
Remediation: The vendor has released a fixed version (2.0.47).
(http://httpd.apache.org/download.cgi)
(http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/Announcement2.html)
Risk: Medium
CVE: CAN-2003-0192
BID: 8134
From the preceding, we find that Tool A gives the most detailed treatment of the
vulnerability and indicates a denial of service is possible. The others indicate information
leakage or weaker encryption. Tool A also gives a URL to obtain the corrected patch for a
Red Hat® system. All three tools rated the problem a medium risk.
The third major platform within the study was Sun Solaris®. For Solaris® we
chose a vulnerability in Sendmail. This application has been a mainstay on the internet for
almost 20 years, yet vulnerabilities in it surface yearly. Addressing them should be a
required test for any tool vendor. We chose an address parsing vulnerability that would
grant root privileges or the privileges of the running sendmail daemon should it be
successfully exploited on a vulnerable system.
Tool A
Description: Sendmail - Address Parsing - Solaris 2.6 - 9
Sendmail versions prior to 8.12.8 are susceptible to root compromise. The
address parser performs insufficient bounds checking in certain conditions
due to a character to integer data type conversion, making it possible for an
attacker to take control of the application. The attacker would have control
of the length, offset and memory layout specifics, thus a message content
based attack stands a chance to succeed.
Risk: High
Test Criteria: 105396-09
Test Criteria: 5.6_x86
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Test Criteria: 105395-09
Test Criteria: 5.6
Test Criteria: 107685-09
Test Criteria: 5.7_x86
Test Criteria: 107684-09
Test Criteria: 5.7
Test Criteria: 110616-09
Test Criteria: 5.8_x86
Test Criteria: 110615-09
Test Criteria: 5.8
Test Criteria: 114137-03
Test Criteria: 5.9_x86
Test Criteria: 113575-04
Test Criteria: 5.9
Test Criteria: SUNWsndmr-11.6.0
Test Criteria: Solaris
Remediation: Install the latest sendmail patch for Solaris (AutoFix NOT
Available) You should stop sendmail, apply the patch, then start sendmail
again. Instructions will follow available patches. Before applying this
update, make sure all previously released errata relevant to your system
have been applied. Visit the patch finder page: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pubcgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-access
Search for the 6 digit patch number - up to and NOT including the dash (-).
This will take you to the latest released patch page, from which you can
download the patch (Click on the patch for your Solaris version, then click
on the HTTP or FTP download link) to install on your Solaris system. Use
'patchadd' to perform the installation, the command 'man patchadd' will
provide further information.
Earliest non-vulnerable patches:
OS Version Patch ID
SPARC Platform
Solaris 2.6 with patch 105395-09 or later
Solaris 7 with patch 107684-09 or later
Solaris 8 with patch 110615-09 or later
Solaris 9 with patch 113575-04 or later

96
Tool B
Description: Sendmail address parser buffer overflow (CAN-2003-0161.)
Sendmail is a Mail Transport Agent (MTA) used on many operating
systems. Sendmail versions 8.12.8 and prior as well as other Sendmailbased commercial versions (see affected platforms) are vulnerable to a
buffer overflow in the prescan() function. The prescan() function breaks
down (or tokenizes) components of an email address prior to processing.
The logic to prevent overly long strings is flawed, allowing a local
attacker to construct a specifically long string that invokes a buffer
overflow and executes arbitrary code at the privilege of the sendmail
daemon (usually root). It is not certain whether remote compromise is
possible using this exploit, although ______ has determined that
significant barriers exist for reliable remote compromise.
Remediation: Upgrade to the latest version of Sendmail (8.12.9 or later),
or apply the appropriate patch for your system, available from the
Sendmail Web site. See References.
For Red Hat Linux:
Upgrade to the latest version of sendmail (8.11.6-26.72 or later), as listed
in Red Hat Security Advisory RHSA-2003:121-06 for more information.
See References.
For Red Hat Linux:
Upgrade to the latest sendmail package, as listed below. Refer to Red Hat
Security Advisory RHSA-2003:120-07 for more information.
See References.
Red Hat 6.2: 8.11.6-1.62.3 or later
Red Hat 7.0: 8.11.6-25.70 or later
Red Hat 7.1: 8.11.6-25.71 or later
Red Hat 7.2: 8.11.6-25.72 or later
Red Hat 7.3: 8.11.6-25.73 or later
Red Hat 8.0: 8.12.8-5.80 or later
Red Hat 9: 8.12.8-5.90 or later
For Gentoo Linux:
Upgrade to the latest version of sendmail (8.12.9 or later), as listed in
Gentoo Security Announcement 200303-27. See References.
For FreeBSD:
Upgrade to the latest version of FreeBSD (4-STABLE or 4.8-RELEASE or
the latest security branch dated later than 2003-03-29), as
listed in FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-03:07.sendmail. See
References.
--OR--
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Apply the appropriate patch for your system, as listed in FreeBSD
Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-03:07.sendmail. See References.
For other distributions:
Contact your vendor for upgrade or patch information.
Tool C
Description. The remote sendmail server, according to its version number,
may be vulnerable to a remote buffer overflow allowing remote users to
gain root privileges. Sendmail versions from 5.79 to 8.12.7 are vulnerable.
Remediation: Upgrade to Sendmail ver 8.12.8 or greater or if you cannot
upgrade, apply patches for 8.10-12 here:
http://www.sendmail.org/patchcr.html
NOTE: manual patches do not change the version numbers. Vendors who
have released patched versions of sendmail may still falsely show
vulnerabilty.
*** ______ reports this vulnerability using only *** the banner of the
remote SMTP server. Therefore, *** this might be a false positive.
See http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-07.html,
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/398025,
Risk: High, CVE : CAN-2002-1337, BID : 6991
Tool D
Description: Sendmail prescan() address buffer overflow
Sendmail 8.12.8 and earlier contains a buffer overflow vulnerability in its
handling of e-mail addresses that can be precipitated by the use of a
special character value. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to
execute arbitrary code in the context of the mail server.
Risk: High
Remediation: Upgrade to the most current version of Sendmail, or apply
the appropriate vendor-supplied patch. Sendmail Consortium home
page (http://www.sendmail.org/)
CERT Advisory CA-2003-12 (http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-200312.html)
CVE: CAN-2003-0161, BID: 7230
From the Solaris analysis, all tools found the vulnerability, and rated it high, since
system compromise or loss to an attacker is the most serious setback to an organization.
The tools do differ on CVE and BID citations for the vulnerability. Tools A and B give the

98
most attention to the solution advice, however B does not include Solaris solutions even
though this appeared on a Solaris system. Tool C warned of potential for false-positives
due to use of service banner grabbing to obtain version information. This is an appropriate
warning since skilled sendmail administrators can manipulate this banner text to echo
arbitrary content. Tools C and D also found this vulnerability on the patched system, thus
they produced false-positives. D did this also without warning of it being possible.
4.4.2 Breadth Analysis
.

Breadth analysis reveals the ability of the candidate tool to span all systems of

concern to the organization. In this analysis, we look at the ability to correctly identify the
running systems and resolve the operating system. This measure addresses the ability of
the tool to discover all present systems, and correctly identify them. This builds user
confidence in the tool’s results. We examine the number of vulnerabilities found on the
full network of machines; this measure indicates the extent of the tool’s ability to recognize
vulnerabilities and bring them to the attention of the user. Following this, we examined the
extent of coverage of vulnerabilities on peripheral systems such as network attached
printers, routers, modems, and wireless access points.

This assessment indicates the

applicability of the tool beyond desktop and server vulnerability management. For the
wireless and modem detection dimension, we counted the number of checks pertaining to
wireless networking access points, SSID, and WEP settings. Table 4.3 also includes
exposures such as opened ports, accessible network shares, and default accounts. The tools
also reported vulnerabilities on the incorrectly guessed operating systems.
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Table 4.3 Breadth Coverage of Tools

Tool
A
Tool
B
Tool
C
Tool
D

Hosts
found
101

Correctly
identified hosts
93

Vulnerabilities Printers/Routers/Modem/Wireless
Exposures
9550
10/1/1/0

100

90

7595

48/13/6/6

101

89

2776

4/39/3/1

101

90

4335

14/4/2/4

Our determination of correctness requires that a tool distinguish between, for example
Windows® 98 and NT, or between ‘Unix®’ and Linux™ or Solaris®. Being able to
precisely identify the operating system of the target indicates ability or potential to
diagnose problems correctly. To address how the tools offered support in the broader
device support aspects, we illustrate with a Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
vulnerability. The printers, routers, and wireless devices – in some cases, are managed via
SNMP, thus each device has an embedded agent included. Compromising the agent on a
router would be a significant intrusion event, and the ability of a tool to cover this is vital.
Tool A did not find the default ‘Set’ community string on the router interface tested.
Tool B.
Description: Snmp Set Guessable Community: SNMP_Set guessed
Community Name and changedsystem information (CAN-1999-0516)
Private The SNMP community name is guessable, and allows anyone who
can guess the name the ability to set new system information. An attacker
can use SNMP to obtain valuable information about the system, such as
information on network devices and current open connections.
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Remediation: Disable or remove the SNMP Service if it is not required. If
your systems require SNMP, take steps to secure the SNMP community
names. To disable or remove the SNMP Service:
For Windows NT:
1. Open the Network control panel. (From the Start menu, select Settings,
Control Panel, Network.)
2. Click the Services tab, and then select the SNMP service.
3. Click Remove, and then click OK to confirm the removal.
For Windows 2000:
1. Open the Control Panel. (From the Start menu, select Settings, Control
Panel.)
2. Double-click Add/Remove Programs, and then double-click
Add/Remove Windows Components in the left pane to open the Windows
Components Wizard.
3. Select Management and Monitoring tools, and then click Details.
4. Clear the Simple Network Management Protocol checkbox, and then
click OK to save the settings.
For Unix:
If SNMP is started from the rc script, comment it out as appropriate for
your operating system. As an example, to disable SNMP under Solaris 2.6,
execute the following commands:
# /etc/init.d/init.snmpdx stop
# mv /etc/rc3.d/S76snmpdx /etc/rc3.d/DISABLED_S76snmpdx
--OR-If SNMP is required on your system, secure the SNMP community names.
For Unix systems, refer to your SNMP documentation for
information on securing SNMP community names. For Windows systems,
secure SNMP community names using the Registry Editor and the control
panel.
To edit the registry so that only approved users can access the SNMP
Community Name:
CAUTION: Use Registry Editor at your own risk. Any change using
Registry Editor may cause severe and irreparable damage and may
require you to reinstall your operating system. Internet Security Systems
cannot guarantee that problems caused by the use of Registry
Editor can be solved.
1. Open Registry Editor. From the Windows Start menu, select Run, type
regedt32, and click OK.
2. Select the
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\ValidCom
munities registry key.
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3. From the Security menu, select Permissions to display the Registry Key
Permissions dialog box.
4. Set the permissions to permit only approved users access.
--AND-To configure Windows SNMP security settings in the control panel:
1. Open the SNMP Service security settings, using the steps listed below,
depending on your version of Windows.
2. Verify that your configuration contains the following security settings:
- At least one Accepted Community Name exists. Empty lists cause SNMP
to accept requests from anyone. (This is discussed in Microsoft
Knowledge Base Article Q99880. See References.)
- The Accepted Community Names are not default or easily guessed
names, such as public.
- The Only Accept SNMP Packets from These Hosts option is selected, and
one or more hosts, IP addresses, or IPX addresses are specified.
- Each host and community name in the lists is a valid, authorized
destination.
To access the SNMP Service security settings:
For Windows NT:
1. Open the Network control panel. (From the Start menu, select Settings,
Control Panel, Network.)
2. Click the Services tab, select the SNMP Service, and then click
Properties.
Risk. High
Tool C.
Description: snmpwalk could get the open port list with the community
name 'public'.
Remediation: None given.
Risk: Low
Tool D.
Description: SNMP Servers: private - SNMP default community name
Risk Level: Medium
A default community name is enabled in this SNMP service. An attacker
can exploit this vulnerability to gather a high degree of sensitive
information about the remote device configuration. The information that
can be retrieved varies between service configurations. Such information
may include: installed software, running processes, installed patches,
network configuration and network connections.
Remediation: Disable this community name, or password protect use of it.
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UCD-SNMP Home Page (http://ucd-snmp.ucdavis.edu/)
A Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) (ftp://ftp.isi.edu/innotes/rfc1157.txt) CVE: CAN-1999-0517
Examining the above samples indicates that Tool B devotes superior attention to the
solution of the Simple Network Management (SNMP) ‘Set’ community string problem, but
does not explicitly include a solution for 3Com or Cisco, both of whom are leaders in
SNMP enabled devices like the subject target router. Tool C found some data from the
router, and explained that obtaining open ports was possible with the default string;
however, no solution was provided. Tool D gave a concise statement of the problem, but
lacked providing a solution. Tool A missed this common problem completely. Tool A
uniquely allows one to define the correct community string for devices, however the choice
was limited to one string, which was not the correct one in this test. This approach of Tool
A did not induce guessing or penetration style behavior by attempting numerous
community strings, however several well known strings exist and the testing of all wellknown strings is reasonable. Tool C does such testing and documents the ones tried in its
results.
Printers are in every modern environment, and can be used by an attacker to hide
information. We look at how printer vulnerabilities are treated by each vendor and provide
a sample of the most serious vulnerability that each tool found on printers in the test lab.
Tool A
Description: Always keep firmware on HP Jetdirect print servers at the
latest revision level. As firmware is revised, performance and security are
improved. With older firmware, attackers can obtain sensitive information
and gain unauthorized access to the printer. Jetdirect firmware can be
upgraded using either Download Manager or HP Web Jetadmin software.
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Both of these applications are automatically able to download the latest
firmware images from the Internet.
Risk Medium
CVE-2000-0636
Variable = system.sysDescr.0
Value = HP ETHERNET MULTI-ENVIRONMENT,ROM
R.22.01,JETDIRECT,JD95,EEPROM R.22.09,CIDATE 01/17/2002
: http://www.hp.com/cposupport/swindexes/hpjetdirec4628_swen.html
Remediation: Install the latest HP Jetdirect printer firmware. (AutoFix
NOT Available) Using a web browser, navigate to
http://www.hp.com/cposupport/swindexes/hpjetdirec4628_swen.html
and download the HP Jetdirect Download Manager to upgrade the HP
Jetdirect firmware. For Jetdirect printer firmware A-J, the most recent
firmware is x.08.40 (where x is A-J). For Jetdirect printer firmware
L-U, the most recent firmware is x.24.08 (where x is L-U). For best
security practice, use non-default community strings. Many SNMP agents
are configured with “public” or “private” as the default
community string when shipped from the factory. These "defaults" should be
changed.
Tool B
Description: SNMPv1Discovery: SNMP version 1 detected (CAN-19990615)
Risk High
SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) is the primary standard
for Internet network management. SNMP services are included in almost e
ry operating system, router, switch, cable or DSL modem, and firewall.
Various implementations of SNMPv1 are vulnerable to a wide range of
attacks. Incorrectly formatted input in SNMP messages can crash the
operating systems and devices that use SNMP. These vulnerabilities may
be possible to exploit remotely, allowing an attacker to compromise
remote systems and devices. SNMP packets containing invalid fields or
data lengths can indicate an attack against SNMP.
Remediation: SNMP should be heavily filtered at your perimeter to
minimize the threat of SNMP-based attacks. If SNMP is not needed in your
environment, consider disabling SNMP completely. Contact your vendor for
patch and upgrade information. CERT Advisory CA-2002-03 includes
details about the vulnerabilities and updates for many SNMP vendors. See
References.
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Tool C
Description: SNMP Agent responded as expected with community name:
public SNMP Agent responded as expected with community name:
internal
Remediation: not offered
Risk High.
CVE : CAN-1999-0517, CAN-1999-0186, CAN-1999-0254, BID : 177,
7081, 7212, 7317
Tool D
Risk Level: Medium
Description: It is recommended that you disable anonymous FTP access if
it is not needed. Anonymous FTP access can lead to an attacker gaining
information about your system that can possibly lead to them gaining
access to your system.
Remediation: Follow your FTP server instructions on how to disable
anonymous FTP.
CVE: CAN-1999-0497
The above examples illustrate that there is a wide range of opinion regarding printer
vulnerabilities. Tool A finds firmware issues, Tool B tests for versions 1 and 2 of SNMP
supported and calls version 1 a high risk.

(SNMP version 1 has many known

vulnerabilities). Tool C shows dexterity in attempting less used community names such as
‘internal’ which elicited a response from the printer. Tool D finds open anonymous ftp
servers on the printer. None of the tools in the sample set does a full set of diagnostics, and
each tool has specific strengths, with Tool B being the closest to full printer diagnosis
according to our measures and judgment.
4.5

Model Validation
To validate the model, we first provide the list of measures used within each

category of the IA metrics taxonomy. We select ordinal weights for each category to
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emphasize that the fundamental purposes of the tool have more weight. Results for the
best-fit model measures are then given.

The results of the full set of measures are

summarized in Table A.18 in the Appendix, along with those for the best-fit model. We
then provide rationale for choice of the representative measures in each category by
explaining how they address the category’s focus. In the at-large set of measures for each
category, we include the scores for those metrics chosen in the best-fit model. We will
look for correlation of results across all the areas of the IA metrics taxonomy in the model.
Table 4.4 summarizes the measures comprising the best-fit model and shows the weights
assigned to each category. Note that Table 3.10 provided the questions, and table 4.4
provides measures addressing the questions.
In Table 4.4, the Weight column serves to distinguish between the categories in the
extent of influence that each has over the selection of a tool. The range in values is from 1
– 3, with 1 being lesser in influence. The higher weighted categories more directly reflect
the purpose and function of the tool. Lower-weighted categories are not ignored, but have
lesser bearing on the intended function of the tool.
The policy management category is concerned with the ability to measure
compliance to the organization’s policies. This requires that the tool have interfaces to
allow customized settings for such things as password handling, auditing, and user rights.
The list of policy settings in the measure is taken from the Windows® 2000 security policy
editor. The measure looks at the extent of settings support in the tools.
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Table 4.4 IA Best-fit Metrics
IA Metrics Class
Policy management

Process maturity
Personnel support
Resource support
Operational practice
Operational
environment
Management
readiness
Technical readiness

Effectiveness

TTOA features in
normal circumstances
TTOA adversary
work factor
TTOA survivability
TTOA risk
TTOA operational
limitations

Measure
count of checks for settings of password, audit,
accounts, user rights, security options, ACL settings,
IP security, encrypted data recovery assessments
Common Criteria certified status
user skill certifications availability
steps per patch
user password compliance measurement
user keeps antivirus updated
Existence of DoS causing checks
patch deployment tools supported – count.
can scans be scheduled – ease/options break ties.
audit use detection
forensics related checks in database
the extent of support for vulnerability cataloging
(CVE, SANS, CERT, BugTraq, CIAC, FedCIRC,
IAVA) 1 for each catalog supported), unique CVE’s
included
the tool’s ability to measures evidence of intrusion
or system compromise
user defined checking
count of checks with no solution/workaround offered
vulnerabilities found in patched systems
quality of solution by steps to solution (patch and
non patch solutions), ease of updating tool
the tool’s installer protects the tool or give advice

Weight
1

characterize what happens when one removes the
vulnerability database before or during the scan
has the tool had reported vulnerabilities on BugTraq
in the past year
can the user write and use her/his own checks?.

1

1
1
1
2
3

1
1

3

3

1

1
1

The process maturity category is difficult for a VAST to measure, however we can
apply this category to the process maturity of the tool vendor; this maturity would manifest
itself in the stability, support, and evolution of the tool over time. This can take the form of
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ISO 9000 or 17799, or SEI CMM-I certifications and Common Criteria certifications. The
Common Criteria certification is selected as it is relatively new, and most directly relates to
Information Assurance.
A component of this certification is an Assurance class to address the software life
cycle management, configuration management, quality management, distribution processes
to name a few [16]. This certification also results in a document called the Security Target
that is posted by the tool’s certifying body or evaluation laboratory for public consumption.
Vendor process maturity claims are stated in the Security Target, and ascertained in the
Certification Report, which is publicly available. Thus, the buyer has a more solid notion
of assurance provided by the tool. It should be stated also that Common Criteria or any
other vendor process certification does not imply the best tool, but it does stipulate that the
vendor’s entire product process has been independently examined, documented and rated
by a qualified outside source. The Common Criteria certification process also does not
fully consider the tool’s functions [16], which is left up to other areas of the IA metrics
taxonomy.
The personnel support category concerns the impact of and on people in the
organization. We chose the availability of user skill certification by the vendor as a
measure in this category. User skills in tool use contribute to Information Assurance for
the organization. A tool in the hands of a properly trained employee stands to be most
effective. VAST tools vary in complexity and features, and the security discipline is
sufficiently important to warrant user skill certifications.
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The resource support category addresses the impact of the tool on company
resources, mainly time and money. This dimension has a large number of potential
measures. For illustration, we chose the cost for a Class C scanning license. Class C refers
to the size of the network being scanned being limited to a single eight bit octet of
cardinality 256, hence the cost of a 250-256 node license is used.

Realistically the

organization should also count time in solution application, average number of annual
maintenance days to get a more solid grasp of resource impact. A tool with efficiently
given solutions may save the company staff overtime payments as well. If a tool disrupts
system resources, the staff would need to perform scans during non-work time. The larger
the network, the greater care must be given to this computation.
The operational practice category considers the localized impact that a user or IT
staff member has on the systems in the network. Users are free to tweak browser settings,
possibly disable antivirus tools, use USB memory keys, PDA’s and other convenient
devices. A VAST should be able to examine these settings. The second operational
category is the environment. This is one of the primary functions for VASTs.
The operational environment category considers the ability to repair vulnerabilities
found, and to preserve the normal functionality of the environment. Thus, we examine
whether the tool contains checks or capabilities that would result in denial of service events
besetting services or entire systems. A red team tester would choose tools with active
exploitation techniques and denial of service causing tests. We also determine if the tool
supports integration with remediation technology. Patch deployment technology addresses
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the concurrent deployment of corrective patches across IT systems in an entire
management domain. The ability to schedule scans is also included here since it would
entail off-peak analysis, which maximizes resource usage. A scheduled scan is practical
when organizations do not require employees to shut down their systems at the end of the
workday. This has indirect support to the Resource Support category as well.
We next looked at the tool support for readiness, both managerial and technical.
The management readiness category is concerned with preserving intellectual or physical
property and employing regular reviews of this protection. Audit trail reviews would
support this to ensure that actions such as configuration changes are traceable to
responsible parties. This category also is concerned with conducting risk assessments.
This could include the regular and logged use of VAST technology. A measure of the
number of checks supporting audit log management supports management readiness. An
additional measure is the support that the tool lends to cyber-forensics activities. Forensics
is a growing area for organizations and law enforcement as increasing numbers of
computer related crimes are being reported. The ability of a tool to detect existence of
forensics tools, possibly in use by unauthorized users would allow an organization to
prepare for possible insider threat related activities. These measures are done by using the
tool’s search features and listing vulnerability checks matching forensics related terms such
as log, cookie, or common tools used in forensics analysis including the Open Source
TCPDump™ and Ethereal™ packet analysis tools.
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The technical readiness category relates to the understanding of vulnerabilities in
the organization. Understanding and prioritized remediation of vulnerabilities is possible
when the tool can equate common descriptive references to a vulnerability to one that is
disclosed in the media. Catalogs such as CERT Advisories, CVE catalog, US Department
of Homeland Security FedCIRC, SANS Top 20, BugTraq and others assign designators for
the most severe vulnerabilities. If an organization employs these catalogs, the tool’s
supporting them would make determination of technical assurance readiness easier. The
CVE and BugTraq catalogs are common in tools, thus this is a minimal criteria. Searches
of the tool for vulnerability catalog support beyond these, measures the technical assurance
readiness determination potential by a VAST.
The effectiveness category measures examine the degree to which the
organization’s defenses are performing as desired. Recording intrusions or evidence of
intrusion, as well as the preventive dimension of detecting vulnerabilities under active
exploitation are included. We selected the ability of the tool to measure the detection of
worms and other malware, and whether the tool allows the user to invoke custom defined
checks. To address prevention further, we searched the tool’s database to find the number
of vulnerabilities reported for which no solution is given. We examined the vendor
databases for this check and counted the number of solutions that indicated none was
available. At a minimum the tool should provide a workaround in all cases.
The measures discussed and taken up to this point address the organization and its
ability to maintain a secure environment. The final group of measures are concerned with
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properties of the tool itself which is referred to as the Technical Target of Assessment
(TTOA) within the IA metrics taxonomy. This covers the features in normal and abnormal
circumstances as well as risks and limitations of the tools.
The TTOA features in the normal circumstances category covers the intuitive and
assumed functions of the tool. We selected the ability to find vulnerabilities in patched
systems. Operating system vendors continually produce patches for their software in
response to external and internal security research efforts. Thus, patching of systems is a
basic IA practice. We considered the ability of a tool to detect vulnerabilities that extend
beyond patching. This area is also conducive to a tool generating false-positive results. In
addition to vulnerability identification, we subtracted values for false positives generated
by tools claiming that fixed systems were still vulnerable. Another measure here would be
to identify false-negative scores. False-negative analysis was not done in our study, but
should be considered by tool users with substantial intellectual property to protect. We
look at the typical number of steps given by the tool to apply solutions as well. A tool that
simply instructs the user to go to the vendor to obtain the patch may omit critical details
that would render a system residually vulnerable to another condition if specialized
knowledge is omitted. A common example of this is in the rebooting or failure to reboot
Windows® systems after they are patched. We examined twenty solutions and followed
available web links to solutions. Tools that quickly provide the patch, and provide insight
into installing it save their owners time in the remediation process.

112
For the behavior in abnormal circumstances, category we looked at the TTOA
adversary work factor measures. This is a measure of the work needed to penetrate a given
system. We address the quality of the tool’s installer to provide protection for the tool. If
this is not done, we examine the installation guide to determine if sufficient information is
provided to secure the tool against an underprivileged insider. A higher ordinal priority is
assigned to the installer security feature. Thus, this study did not perform penetration
studies of the tools, but focused on the tool’s ability to resist obvious penetrations. Full
penetration analysis evidence should be sought out by tool acquiring organizations.
We also looked at the category of TTOA survivability in the event of a depredatory
event in the tool’s installation. We studied the tool’s handling of the instance where its
database was removed. We considered if the tool provides alerts to the user, and whether
any functions can be performed without the database. These measures are categorical as
we grouped tool behavior into defined behavior levels.
The TTOA risk category examines the potential risk to the tool or to the
organization using it. VAST tools are powerful, and contain storehouses of information
that are ripe for abuse and misuse. If installation of the tool requires an administrative user,
and if the tool connects to a remote system it may be possible for a non-privileged user to
obtain elevated privileges or obtain unauthorized access to information. To assess this risk
we looked at the number of vulnerabilities of the tool within the past year reported on the
SecurityFocus BugTraq site.

The adversary work factor category measure of secure

installation is a partial countermeasure to abuse of the tool’s by incidental or malicious
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users. A rogue administrator is a risk to any organization. If a tool can mitigate the impact
of a rogue, this would be another good risk countermeasure. Such a countermeasure would
be the support of the least privilege principal of security through mechanisms such as role
based access control.
The final category is TTOA operational limitations. Here we looked at the range of
the tool in covering components of the organization’s network. Other areas to consider are
platform availability, whether any quick or instant remediation is possible from the tool or
whether the tool reporting facilities can support the organization’s needs. We did not
measure this in this study since it varies with organizations. Rather, we looked at the
number of reports and format combinations offered, which is an indirect way to gauge
report limitations.
The results of tool examination for this model are given below. Table 4.5 shows
the results for the best-fit model alongside the summarized results of the at-large collection
of measures. The cell entries show the number of measures in which the tool placed with
greatest positive distinction. The full set of results is provided in the Appendix as a set of
tables. Tools that did not place best in a measure category are omitted from the respective
cell. The numbers given are ordinal counts of best-place measures. Ties are broken if
possible, and allowed to stand if not broken. For example, an indicator such as (D,7)
implies that Tool D was best or tied for best in seven measures within the category. We
observe the incidence of the same tool letter appearing in the best-fit and at-large columns
in the table below. The weight column shows a comparative priority value assigned to
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each measure class. Note that tool technical performance is distributed through several
categories in this assessment framework. This is not surprising in that the tools have
capabilities to assess wide-ranging condition types, and many of these conditions relate to
aspects of the organization’s IA posture. Table A.18 in the Appendix, presents numerical
scoring for the tools in the study, and includes weighted scores as would be obtained by the
best-fit model. Table 4.5 shows the number of measures won by each of the tools along the
categories in the IA metrics taxonomy.

Table 4.5 Comparison of Best-fit Model with At-large Measures
IA Metrics Class
Policy management
Process maturity
Personnel support
Resource support
Operational practice
Operational
environment
Management
readiness
Technical readiness
Effectiveness
TTOA features in
normal circumstance
TTOA adversary
work factor
TTOA survivability
TTOA risks
TTOA operational
limitations

Best-fit Model
(B,5), (A,2), (D,1)
(A,1)
(B,1)
(A,1)
(A,2)
(A,2), (D,1)

At-large Measures
(A,2),(B,9),(D,1)
(A,2), (B,1)
(A,3), (B,4), (D,2)
(A,2),(B,2),(C,3),(D,3)
(A,6), (B,3), (C,1), (D,1)
(A,8),(B,4),(C,4),(D,7)

Weight
1
1
1
1
2
3

(A,1),(B,1),(C,1)

(A,9),(B,3),(C,1),(D,3)

1

(A,1)
(A,2),(B,1)
(A,),(C,1),(D,1)

(A,2)
1
(A,7),(B,6),(C,2),(D,3)
3
(A,19),(B,10),(C,5),(D,14) 3

(A,1)

(A,1)

1

(B,1), (D,1)
(A,1),(D,1)
(B,1),(C,1),(D,1)

(B,1),(D,1)
(A,6),(B,4),(C,4),(D,4)
(B,3),(C,3),(D,4)

1
1
1
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In Table 4.5, the at-large measures column represents the union of all measures
assembled from mass print literature, requirements lists from potential customers of Harris,
independent security consultants, and test laboratories as they are mapped to the IA metrics
taxonomy categories. The best-fit measures column represents the measures that most
typify the intention of the category among those in the at-large measures set. The weight
column is as explained earlier for Table 4.4 with higher weights being associated with
intended tool functionality. Next, we discuss consistencies and inconsistencies in the
results. The results here are considered along with the depth and breadth analyses as
gauges of consistency in the measures taken.
4.5.1 Consistencies
We see in table 4.5, that there is strong agreement between the results among the
sets of measures chosen as indicators between the best-fit and at-large sets in the
categories. Policy management shows that one tool stood out in the best-fit and at-large
measure groupings. Process maturity shows that the same tool stood out in the measures of
this grouping. Personnel support showed that the tool standing out in the best-fit model
also had a share of the best results in the at-large grouping. Operational practice showed
that the same tool stood out in both best-fit and at-large groupings.

Operational

environment showed that the two tools indicated in the best-fit measures also showed as
better in the at-large measure grouping.

Management readiness showed a consistent

ordering of tools between the best-fit and at-large measure groupings. Effectiveness shows
that the tool indicated in best-fit also showed strongest in the at-large grouping. The TTOA
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features in normal circumstances are a large measure grouping as is expected. The best-fit
measures here indicate one of the tools that ranked as best in the at-large grouping, and also
selected lower placing tools in the at-large grouping. TTOA Risk indicated one tool
placing as best in the at-large measure grouping and another that finished in the mid range.
In each of these cases, the best-fit measures paralleled the at-large results in illustrating tool
attributes.
4.5.2 Inconsistencies
In resource support measurement, we used a single dimensional metric, where as an
organization having knowledge of remediation time and frequency and charge rates for
staff would devise a complex metric to replace it. This may change the ordering in this
category to favor a tool that provides fast and accurate remediation advice. In the technical
readiness category, we found two measures, which comprised the set. In TTOA adversary
work factor, we had a single measure: more measures are needed, however exploring this
further exceeded the scope of this study, and tool vendors do not readily reveal
shortcomings. An acquirer of VAST or any other tool types can learn about penetration
tests or other tool vulnerability assessments by reading independent lab reports such as by
the NSS Group [39], or in the tool certification reports and independent test reports for
tools. The survivability measures are related to adversary work factor; our tests were
limited due to scope of a serious effort such as tool survivability studies.
From the preceding we note that the best-fit model based on measures of the IA
metrics taxonomy quite well represent the performance of a much larger set of measures.
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This taxonomy addresses a much broader portion of the IA discipline than have previous
reviews and comparisons of vulnerability assessment scanning tools.
Many tool reviews place emphasis on the quantity of vulnerabilities found in a tool
and predict it as best based on this. This practice is contrary to Kitchenham, Pfleeger, and
Fenton’s [29] observation on basing predictive models on empirical data. In our analysis,
Tool D often found the most risks, and found them faster, and placed high in many reviews,
however applying measurement science and guided by the IA metrics taxonomy [59], we
see a different outcome. Examination of the results obtained by using the best-fit model
indicates that Tool A scores as being the best choice for an acquirer under the conditions
that we outlined in using the model. Note that acquirers with goals in opposition to those
used in this study may determine that a different tool is best. Thus, we offer evidence that
the best-fit model methodology helps focus attention on the IA posture of an organization
and applies holistic discipline to the problem of IA technology assessment toward meeting
the goals of the tool user.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

The hypothesis under investigation by this study is that it is possible to quantify IA
suitability of vulnerability assessment scanning tools (VAST) in their utility given that a
sufficiently discriminating set of measurable attributes is found.
Product comparison efforts have often focused on technical capabilities, with
VAST being no exception. Within IA, there are personnel and organizational components
accompanying the technical concerns. To choose a best tool for the organization requires
the ability to develop measures and metrics that consider personnel, organizational, and
technical elements.
5.1 Contributions of this Research
We have used the IA metrics taxonomy of Vaughn, Henning, and Siraj [59] as a
framework to organize thinking about extra-technical measurements and their applicability
toward VA scanning tool quality assessment.

This framework exposed areas of

vulnerability assessment scanning tools that have been ignored within prior tool reviews
and comparisons. The areas exposed pertain to organizational and personnel performance
enhancement within IA. Technical areas pertaining to assurance value and resistance to
attack and survivability are also under-rated but considered here.
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We applied results in metric selection and construction from software engineering,
and reached a conclusions consistent with results stated in [29, 46]. We identified a subset
of known and derived metrics to construct a best-fit measures model. Using the subset we
evaluated four VA scanning tools to determine of any would stand out. Taking this result,
we then compiled measures for the larger set of measures and looked for either validation
or contradiction. We discovered that the measures chosen, and metrics derived did indicate
strongly that a tool fairing well in the best-fit set of measures would do similarly well in a
much larger set of measures. There were some areas where few good measures exist,
indicating that more effort needs to be spent to derive measures for these areas. Examples
are in the areas of adversary work factor and survivability of a tool, as well as in the ability
of the tool to support organizational technical readiness assessment.
Applicability of this technique could serve as a guide in determination of tool
suitability for an acquiring organization. The rankings can be changed; based on priorities
and the intended user. For example, the needs of an attacking red team would differ from
an IT department already having system management privileges. The fundamental concept
behind this research was to show that given the groupings afforded by the IA metrics
taxonomy, the most important or relevant measure from each grouping can be used as an
indicator for the group in assessing a tool’s ability to provide the required support to the
given grouping. Note that one should always include key performance indicators of the
tool category in any assessment. The IA metrics taxonomy provides two categories to
consider the operational environment and tool effectiveness dimensions. This work also
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illustrated that tool rating based on too few organizational priorities and observation of
subsets of empirical data may not serve in the acquiring organization’s best interests. The
research goal of validating the IA metrics taxonomy [59] via this research has also been
satisfied. The taxonomy proved sufficiently flexible and well defined to enable placement
of existing measures in it. There are some measures that serve more than one category in
the taxonomy. For example ease of updates contributes to user skill support, current
vulnerability detection, and a strong feature for a tool in normal circumstances. The
taxonomy highlighted the contribution that automated updates can make to a tool.
5.2 Future Research
There is much work possible in follow-up to this research. One contribution
possible is the proposal of a set of technical capabilities to be included in Common Criteria
protection profile option packages [16]. The results can also be used to formulate security
functional requirements for inclusion in vulnerability assessment protection profiles. This
would contribute to discussion and development of standard capabilities by which tools
could be assessed on essential technical merit. Further work may include a tool to score
security policies on coverage of the sub classifications in the IA metrics taxonomy. This
could be used to help organizations verify that their current policy covers all of their
security concerns. It would be helpful to show which clauses of the security policy are
violated upon exploitation of vulnerabilities in systems and user programs. Having this
understanding will convey to the stakeholder the impact of exploitation of the vulnerability
upon his or her security environment. Additionally, this could be constructed and intended
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to compliment the Smith, Newton Common Criteria policy taxonomy. Other tools could
be developed to account for scope of a policy in assessing vulnerabilities; show classes and
sub classes that exceed the coverage of the policy. This would illustrate any needed
extensions to the taxonomy. Further work in the development of metrics for interpreting
the results of scanning tools is possible, with a goal of showing the true effectiveness of a
tool at identifying vulnerabilities, providing advice on repairing them, and measuring the
actual cost of use –including metrics for learning time, and extraneous information filtering
time. To address the dynamic nature of vulnerabilities that become more severe upon
publication of an exploit, a severity metric in the form of a severity scale could be
submitted for comment to the vulnerability assessment community. An approach that may
prove useful in ascertaining the severity of a given vulnerability is in the use of fuzzy
cognitive maps (FCM). They have been applied successfully in intrusion detection systems
[49] and in development of business performance metrics [28]. The severity metric could
be obtained from a vulnerability severity model based on an FCM determining the
interrelations of a vulnerability to its environment, discovery, exploitation status, and
degree of deployment. Training of the FCM could be conducted using data from common
vulnerabilities from the CVE catalog for which all sufficient data relating to the above
factors can be found. The CERT/CC organization’s vulnerability severity scoring system
could be used as a validation of the model’s ability to indicate the severity of each
vulnerability.
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In further work, we could devise metrics that address the value to an organization in
repair of vulnerabilities. Studies exist that illustrate the average costs of recovering from
damage done by an exploited virus or vulnerability. Tools could be developed to assist
stakeholders with estimating the impact of vulnerability assessment tools upon their
organization. One method for understanding impact is to realize the cost of security
incidents. Some work has been conducted in this area. One example is the “Incident Cost”
formula based on the Internet Integrity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act [19]. In
his online document, Dittrich mentions the Committee for Institutional Cooperation (CIC)
sponsored Incident Cost Analysis and Modeling Projects [14, 15]. Ideas from these studies
could be incorporated into metrics to assess the potential loss from not owning and
operating a vulnerability assessment tool. Once baseline cost metrics are established, an
organization can regularly assess their security costs to other productivity measures to
understand the value of diligent vulnerability assessment, and the returns on investment
through reduced system downtime and IT administrator overtime due to security related
incidents. Development of a metric to assess vulnerabilities on their relative severity or
likelihood of their exploitation against security policy will contribute to this valuation
computation.
To address a goal of integrated vulnerability assessment, and intrusion detection
and prevention tools, a set of vulnerability primitives could be developed along with a
representation algebra, which can be used to encode policy statements into a notation that
can be used to build protection rules for active defense applications.
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TEST RESULTS

134

135
A. Test Results
Having used the best-fit model to search for and identify the tool best suited for the
IT organization acquiring a VA scanning tool, we present the set of measures taken during
the study, noting which of them are used in the best-fit model. The IA metrics taxonomy
[59] categories were decomposed into VA scanning tool property measures relating to each
category. The measures are presented in a set of tables below. The measures within the
best-fit model are identified within the tables below by an ‘at’ symbol, (@), and in
explanatory text following the listed measures for each category. The measures given also
contain comments on the manner of measurement, with subjective ordinal ratings of 1- 5
for given capabilities of tools as they were measured. In a quality assessment study, many
of the measurements are ordinal rankings, as Schneidewind indicates is reasonable [46].
Generally, a lower integer number when given is the more desirable capability. Measures
of quantity are also included and noted to explain the nature of what is being measured.
The measures and categories are similar to quality assessment measures as that is the
primary goal of the best-fit model discussed within this study.
The best-fit model assigns greater scalar weight to four IA metrics taxonomy
categories. These will have a notation of (2x) or (3x) in the summary row located at the
bottom of each table. The operational practice category is weighted at 2x since the tool use
will constantly affect the operations of its users in some tangible way, but overall this
category is less important than actual performance in vulnerability assessment.

The

operational environment, effectiveness, and TTOA features in normal circumstances
categories are assigned a weight of 3x since these categories are concerned with aspects of
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tool performance and effectiveness; and are directly measuring performance characteristics
of the tool.
The measures in this study were taken from various sources including popular
reviews in mass print literature, requirements lists from potential customers of Harris,
independent security consultants, and test laboratories. Many sources converge on key
performance related measures, while other measures were derived from a single source and
stand as unique. This set of measures was then mapped into the IA metrics taxonomy
along the intentions of each measure as this relates to the nature of a category within the
taxonomy. The weightings used for the categories indicate the relative amount of influence
of the category over the suitability of the tool. The weights were kept simple, yet attempted
to place relative importance and influence on the measures in the model. The set of
measures chosen for the best-fit model most directly address the intention of the category,
and are repeatable to measure.
The concluding table presents a tally of the categories won by each tool. In many
cases two or more tools tied for the best measure. The best-fit model measures are
included in this table, and one can compare the best-fit model to the full set of measures. It
can be observed that it is not necessary to perform all measures used in this study, if all of
the best-fit model measures are taken. The best-fit model measures indicate relative trends
and ordering of the tools.
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Table A.1 Policy Management

Measure
Public policy
Heavy infrastructure /
process control safety
Public policy
Public policy

Comments
Tool A
HIPAA
SCADA
systems
Gramm-LeachBliley
Sarbanes-Oxley

Tool C

Tool D

1

Security policy @

Password

11

9

9

9

Security policy @

Accounts

13

16

0

4

Security policy @

Audit

21

28

0

0

Security policy @

User rights

28

36

10

3

Security policy @

Security options 9

20

2

3

Security policy @

Encrypted data
recovery
IP security
policies
ACL settings

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

2

9

0

1

Security policy @
Security policy @
Wins

Tool B
1
1
1

In public policy matters, only Tool B mentioned this concern on its website at the
time of the study. All security policy measures listed in the table above are used in the
best-fit model. The counts refer to the number of different elements tested for by each tool.
The concern for complying with regulations in the health care (HIPAA), finance (GrammLeach-Bliley), corporate accountability (Sarbanes-Oxley), and the public utilities which use
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to monitor production of
electricity or water treatment processes all will be compelled to protect their IT resources.
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Table A.2 Process Maturity
Measure
Vendor tool
certification @
Tool vendor
production process
certifications
Operations
certifications

Comments
Tool A
Common Criteria
1
certification
SEI-CMM, ISO 9000, ISO 2
17799 Certifications

Tool B
0

Tool C
0

Tool D
0

0

0

0

SysTrust certification

0

1

0

0

2

1

0

0

Vendor process
maturity wins

The process certification status of the tool vendor is used in the best-fit model, as
this is a predictor of the likely overall quality of the tool.

The Common Criteria

certification process considers aspects of the tool’s high-level design, functional
specification, requirements traceability, standard production and delivery techniques as
well as the security functions claimed. Systems acquisition beyond scanning and patching
may benefit from systems certified as SysTrust compliant.
Table A.3 Personnel Support
Measure
Tool training

Comments
User class offered

Tool A
1

Tool B
1

Tool C
0

Tool D
1

Form: 3=online help only,
1
2=3+web based, 1=2+hard
copy
User skill
1=Independent (e.g., GIAC), 3
certification @
2=vendor created (e.g. ISSCA)), 3=completion cert.
Trouble
support Online FAQ, phone, e-mail, 3
availability
wizard – count 1 for each

1

2

2

2

0

3

3

2

3

Personnel
support wins

4

0

2

Documentation

3
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User skill certification is the most rigorous indicator in the personnel support
category, and is used as the best-fit measure for support of personnel.

Certifying

proficiency with a tool ensures both user and vendor that the tool will be used as intended
and to the fullest potential, and minimizes support calls to the vendor.
The resource support category is presented next.

This addresses costs to the

organization because of choice of a tool, or in performing functions to use, or support the
tool.

The measures here address the relative ease of performing the basic steps in

vulnerability assessment through use of a tool.
Table A.4 Resource Support
Measure
Price
Setup
Update
Scan
Patch @

Comments
Purchase cost per class C network
1=Installer, 2=manual/make 3=site
visit needed
1=Automatic, 2=automated test, with
manual get, 3=manual test/get
1=Set range, go 2=setup
range/OS/access
Observed clicks to download link
(mode statistic)

Wins

Tool A
$4,370
1

Tool B
$10,000
1

Tool C
$0
1

Tool D
$10,000
1

2

3

3

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

3

2

2

2

3

3

The most frequent operation of those listed is applying patches, since several
patches will likely be applied per target machine per scan. Thus, the most impact in the
lifespan of the tool comes from ease of applying patches; which saves time; this is the bestfit model measure from this category.

For decisions where there is a large gap in

acquisition or support costs between contending tools, attention should be paid to
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estimating the labor time involved in applying patches to targets and weigh this against the
purchase price difference.
Table A.5 Operational Practices
Measure
Password
strength tests @

Comments
1=Yes, no disruption
2=yes locks out
accounts, 3=no
Checks
for 1=yes, 2=no
screen locking,
Antivirus
out 1=Yes, 2=no
dated @
Antivirus off
1=Yes, 2=no
Browser settings 1=Yes 2=related, 0=no
USB
memory 1=Yes, 2=no
key used
Modem in use
1=Yes, 2=no
Wins (2x)

Tool A
1

Tool B
2

Tool C
3

Tool D
2

1

2

2

2

1

2

2

2

2
1
1

2
1
2

2
0
2

2
2
2

2
6

1
3

2
1

2
1

Operational practice addresses normal routines and behaviors of users in the
environment.

Two measures are included within the best-fit model in this category.

Password strength assessment and checking for updated anti-virus signature files were
chosen due to the persistent vigilance needed to manage both of these concerns. Tools
must perform this functionality often, without disrupting work of employees. If active
password strength tests were done, a VA scanning tool user would cause all user accounts
tested to become locked out. This results from policies to enforce account locking after a
set number of consecutive failed login attempts. In high data value environments, the
concern for employees carrying data in USB memory devices is likely to surface as well.
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Within the operational environment category, presented in Table A.6, we consider
measures address the capability of the tool to perform its functions without upsetting the
normal operating conditions in the host environment.
Table A.6 Operational Environment

Measure
Port scan flexibility

Port related
vulnerability
presentation
Latent vulnerability
detection (non running
software)
Network discovery
Discovery correctness
Device discovery
diversity
Network map
presentation
Tool potential to disrupt
environment @
Presence of disruptive
checks
Disabled disruptive
checks
Tool architecture

Comments
1=Customizable, 2=all
possible, 3=well-known
only
1=remediation is given,
2=details of port,
3=simple listing
1=Solutions given,
2=detected only, 0=none.

Tool A
1

Tool B
2

Tool C
1

Tool D
1

3

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

Devices found
OS detection percentage
Unique device types
found
1=Topology given,
2=chart, 3=text listing

101
93
17

101
92
16

101
90
13

101
91
17

3

3

3

2

1

2

2

2

0

162

129

55

0

1

1

1

3

3

2

3

2.

1

0

1.

Denial of service tests:
1=none, 2=exist
# DoS checks-ordinal
rank, (0 is highest score)
DoS disabled/default
1=yes, 0=not applicable
1=Agents, 2=remote
control console, 3=single
GUI
Integration with
Remediation product
remediation products @ interoperability count
Database analysis tool Database scanner
integration
Intrusion prevention
1=yes available, 2=not
availability
available
Scheduling of future
1=built-in, 2=tool
scans @
instructions, 0=none
Wins (3x)

1
1

1

2

1

2

2

2

1

8

4

4

7

Table A.7 Management Readiness
Measure
Confidentiality,
encryption)
Integrity

Comments
Related checks

Tool A
84

Tool B
58

Tool C
5

Tool D
15

Related checks

4

3

1

0

Availability,
Related checks
denial of service
Authentication
Related checks

541

154

26

105

103

79

26

35

Access Control
permission
Non Repudiation
Accountability,
audit, logging
Records
Audit
configuration
analysis @

Related checks

184

75

28

45

Related checks
Related checks

0
109

0
26

0
3

1
23

1224
2,1

1010
2,3

1265
2,3

2

3

2

8

110

44

1

2

1

0.322712

0.088118

0.177075

3

1

3

2530
1=customizable, 2,1
2=groupings
select,
3=predefined
1=Custom;
2
Reporting
2=selectable,
(flexibility,
diversity, ease of 3=Fixed
use)
Forensics
# Related checks 90
support (login
or
log, changes)
policies/configur
ations
Vendor incident 2=Email only,
1
handling
1=Email+Phone
IA Term
Sum of related
0.405138
Frequency
checks / all
checks
Wins
9

The best-fit model measures here are the potential of the tool to upset the
production environment. Active checks that cause denial of service are of concern. The
support of patch deployment tools is another large issue, thus it is included. A third issue is
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the analysis of the environment while workers are away, such as weekends or overnight is
important, this can be done if scheduling of scans is easier.
Audit reviews should happen regularly, thus this capability is included in the bestfit model. Forensics support will also prove to be valuable when an organization needs it.

Table A.8 Technical Readiness
Measure
CVE citations
@
Vulnerability
checks
Other catalogs

Comments
Unique CVE entries

Tool A
1389

Tool B
481

Tool C
1050

Tool D
823

Total checks

2500

1275

1800

1600

3

1

2

0

0

0

1 for each beyond BID, 8
CVE (CERT, FedCIRC,
SANS, CIAC, IAVA (4)
Catalog Rank
2
Wins

The total checks in the database count above is not considered a competitive
measure, since vendors create checks differently There is not consistent or standardized
method among vendors for creating vulnerability checks. Some checks are for a single
vulnerability on a single OS version, while others include multiple vulnerabilities on a
single OS version, or on multiple versions. The unique CVE citation is a valid measure
since CVE entries describe a single unique vulnerability. Note also that the vendor’s
association of CVE names for each vulnerability was not examined for correctness. Close
examination of the CVE catalog; including searches for keywords reveals that subtle
differences distinguish between vulnerabilities.
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Table A.9 Effectiveness
Measure

Comments

Tool A

Tool B Tool C

Tool D

Intrusion evidence @

Count of backdoor/brute
force/ports/sniffers/shares

3

5

4

4

Malicious code
detection

Count of
85
Trojans/worms/backdoors
malware/trojan/backdoor/worm

88

7

22

Mis-detection

1=No false-positive / false
negative results, 2=some falsepositives found
1=Single click fixable
solutions exist, 2=not so
1=Instant remediation-retest
2=rescan 3=additional tools
needed
1=Remediation-undo
capability, 2=lacing undo
1=In some reports, 2=no

2

2

2

2

1

2

2

2

1

2

2

3

1

2

2

2

1

1

2

2

2

1

2

2

2,3

1,2,3

2,3,4

1,2,3,5

1

1

1

1

0

87
1232
6

155 1010 22 1275

Quick repair capability
Verification of
remediation @
Reversal of quick fix
remediation
Severity level is
explained by the tool
Remediation process
management

1= Provides process
management / remediation
oversight, 2=does not
Customizable/extensible 1=User supplied data, 2=user
vulnerability checks
groupings of checks possible,
3=pre-defined, 4=user script
writing, 5=automated tool
heuristic scanning (attack
methods)
Solution
1=Workarounds given 2=not
detail/implementation
given
Problem without
# checks with no-fix given
solution @
Wins (3x)

7

2

3

The effectiveness category presented next addresses the impact of the tool within
the organization. This is observed in the capability of the tool to help in assessing a
suspected intrusion by a malicious software agent, or by isolating extraneous open ports or
running services. The ease of applying solutions is addressed here, as is verification of
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repairs and reversal of a repair. Reversals are necessary when the patch induces an
unacceptable degradation in a needed service, or if the patch is found to be otherwise
defective, such as incomplete download. Additionally, there is little value in a tool with no
solutions to problems found. The measures in best-fit model within this category are the
detection of intrusion evidence, verification of remediation, and the extent to which
solutions are provided for vulnerabilities.
Table A.10 Effectiveness Case Study

Measure
RPC DCOM Case
MS03-026 detection
available
Exploit posted +14 days
MSBlaster released +25
days
Nachi/Welchia released
+33 days
Nachi/Welchia
detection
MS03-039 Released
MS03-039 exploit
published
MS03-039 exploit
detection
Wins

Comments

Tool A

Tool B

Tool C

Tool D

Days past original ms03-026 2
disclosure

14

9

1

Days past original mso3-026 37
disclosure
Responsiveness Rank
1
MS03-039 Check available 1

40+

40+

39

3
1

2
7

1
1

Days past mso3-039 release 1

1

2

1

4

2

0

4

Another indicator of effectiveness is to observe how the tool vendors respond to
announced vulnerabilities. During this study, the Microsoft® Remote Procedure Call
(RPC) vulnerability was disclosed, and patches were released by Microsoft. Table A.10
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presents observed availability in days past the announcements of the vulnerability. There
was a follow-on vulnerability discovered in the patch for the initial vulnerability. This case
shows the ability of the tool vendors to respond in a real world example. None of these
measures are included in the best-fit model, however the data is supplied as further
measures of an organizations performance at meeting vulnerabilities and exploits in real
life. Note also that past performance does not automatically assure that of the future.
To this point in the presentation of measures, the emphasis has been on the
organization. The IA metrics taxonomy also considers properties about the tool itself
referred to as the technical target of assessment. The remaining measures given examine
the properties of the tool itself relating to static and dynamic properties. Included in this
section are the results from using each of the tools against a collection of target machines of
well-known configuration. An evaluating organization is likely to have good familiarity
with the configurations of its machines.
The TTOA features in normal circumstances category is split into two tables for
readability. Following the two parts is a table of results from scanning well-known and
reproducible target systems. The features in normal circumstances category is assigned the
highest weighting in the best-fit model, along with effectiveness. From this category, the
measures included in the best-fit model include the number of vulnerabilities found in
patched systems, the relative ease in which solutions can be applied, and the ease at which
the tool can be updated. The first of these, vulnerabilities in patched systems considers
aspects of system management. The ability to find solutions fast and apply them fast is
useful to anyone having large numbers of systems to administer.
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Table A.11 TTOA Features in Normal Circumstances Part I
Measure
Solution accessibility @
Patch preparation is given
Additional reference data
Speed of scan
Unique feature
Attack modes
Scan trend assessment
Ease of use

Task Atomicity
Current security policy
compliance

Comments
Steps to download
patches
Advice/prerequisites
for patches given
Background links
Scan time – all safe
checks
Orange book C2
checks
1=Yes, 2=no

Tool A
1

Tool B
2

Tool C
2

Tool D
2

1

1

0

0

8
1:15

2
57:00:00

1
1:45

2
1:10

1

0

0

0

2

1

1

1

1=Yes, 2=no
Clicks, startup to
scanning of 1 new
host worst and best
Only port scan
1=Editable,
2=predefined, 3=not
supported

1
13 1

1
93

2
16 10

2
31

1
1

1
2

1
3

1
2

User access to system
utilities
Command line /
automation
Integrates with data
management
Database server
configuration analysis

System tool access
from within GUI
CLI (API)

7

2

0

7

1

1

0

0

1=Yes, 2.=partial,
3=no
Published tools
support SQL

2

2

3

2

0

1

1

1

Provides data mining

1=Yes, 2=no

2

2

2

2

Update mechanism @

1=Automated, 22
2=checks only,
3=manual means
required
1=Installer, 2=Unix 1
style make/config

3

3

1

1

1

1

9

5

2

8

Installation
Wins (3x)

The ease of updating the tool is important as this can ensure that the most recent set of
checks is included, and this can be installed with little effort from the user. Organizations
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applying this model may also see priority in additional measures being included from this
category.
Table A.12 TTOA Features in Normal Circumstances Part II

Measure
Product knowledge
base
Additional background
sources provided

Comments
1=Publicly available, 2=private

CVE/BugTraq ID are the
baseline. Count of others
(CERT,FedCIRC,CIAC,SANS)
Scalability
1=single copy/host
Deployable scanning
# distributed
Control console
1=Controling, 2=receive only
Policy distribution
1=Agents, 2=message, 0=none
Scan progress indicator 1=Active, 2=start/stop only,
3=no indication
Progress/debug logging 1=Event logs+text 2=one of
these, 3=none
Audit trail support 1=Windows auditing used inside
Windows Event Logs tool, 0=not used, rely on simple
etc.
text logs.
Usability – scan
Scan configuration change - #
configuration
steps
Usability – scan
Scan # steps
execution
Usability – repair
Repair # steps
clarity
Report format * data
Reports * output forms
format combinations
Internationalization
Reports to foreign languages
Scanning process
1=Wizard, 2=user guide,
explained or facilitated 3=none
Incorrect GUI functions # malfunctions
Explanation of what
Defective features found
was broken
Tool interface tool bar # Icons
Tool interface menu bar # Menus
Tool interface menus
# Picks
Wins (3x)

Tool A
2

Tool B
1

Tool C
1

Tool D
1

5

1

0

2

1
0
2
0
1

1
many
1
0
2

1
0
2
0
1

1
many
1
0
1

1

2

2

2

1

0

0

0

4

3

7

3

6

4

2

3

1-3

4

4

4

1258

87

3

3

0
2

1
2

0
3

0
1

0

0

26
13
68
10

9
9
58
5

1
pdf
broken
16
5
37
3

1
miner
not obv
13
6
42
6
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The use of attack techniques is listed here, but not included in scoring since users of
VAST’s have both attack and non-attack orientations. The patched system vulnerability
count and the discussion on solution characteristics are given in Chapter IV of this study.
The features in normal circumstances category is the largest one for which
measures are devised. Users acquiring IA tools have the most help from literature and
peers, and requirements in devising measures that assess desired characteristics. Most of
the product evaluation studies dwell on measures fitting this category.

Finding

vulnerabilities in fully patched systems is a best-fit model measure. Other measures are the
ease of applying VA tool updates, and the ease of obtaining prescribed patches for
vulnerabilities. To indicate the important performance properties of VA scanning tools, the
Table A.13 has been provided.
Table A.13 shows the specific test timed in seconds, below this is a row for the
vulnerabilities found by each tool. A third row shows bandwidth measured on the scanning
machine as it assesses the target machine. The fourth and last row shows the packet count
observed during the analysis. Below these six groupings of four rows are other measures
taken for the tools. Memory used at startup of the tool, and during the scan are listed, as
measured with the Task Manager in Windows®, and the vmstat utility in Linux. Other
measures include the load introduced to the CPU during the scan, measured using Task
Manager, and vmstat on respective operating systems. The measure ‘Can give up on
problem nodes’ indicates the ability for the user to instruct the tool to not waste time on a
non responsive address. Inactive addresses, and blocked ports are examples of such cases.
The ping time measure examines the default ping time to wait between attempts. A setting
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of 3,000 milliseconds (3 seconds) is most common. The four ranking rows concluding the
table present summaries of the comparative performance of each tool within the given
measurement category. The raw simple measures based ranking considers the averaged
ranking across the four measurement areas. There are many ways to deem the best tool.
Efficiently finding vulnerabilities is the intention of the measurement ranking in this table.
A tool may find the most vulnerabilities, but impose heavier network demands, or it may
run faster than others, but miss some vulnerabilities. We measured the bandwidth used by
a tool and packets sent during its scanning session. The vulnerabilities found per packet
sent or per byte sent was not found to be a valuable measure unless the measurement can be
made with identical lists of vulnerabilities on the same target. Memory used per node
scanned can be an effective predictor of the node scanning capacity of a tool. This may
indicate the number of licenses of a tool one needs to purchase given that the scanning host
system has a known memory size. We did not have enough nodes at our disposal to push
the tools to the point of space management performance. It may be valuable to stress the
tool on a full disk in order to see how the tool handles deterioration in the environment.
The raw simple measures ranking calculates the placement of the tool among the others in
the study within the speed, bandwidth, vulnerabilities found, and memory size measures at
the bottom of Table A.13. This set of measures indicates that users must prioritize the
trade-offs between speed, accuracy, availability and clarity of solutions, support for
integration with other tools in the enterprise among other factors.
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Table A.13 TTOA Scan Performance
Test
full safe scan-of un-patched Windows 2000
Vulnerabilities found
bandwidth, bps
packets,
full safe scan Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 #
Vulnerabilities found #, @
bandwidth, bps #,
packets #,
full safe scan RedHat 8 un-patched
Vulnerabilities found,
bandwidth, bps
packets,
full safe scan single RedHat 8 fully patched
Vulnerabilities found, @
bandwidth, bps
packets,
full safe scan single Solaris 8 un-patched
Vulnerabilities found,
bandwidth, bps
packets,
full safe scan single Solaris 8 fully patched
Vulnerabilities found, @
bandwidth, bps
packets,
Memory at startup MB
Memory used / node scanned MB
Memory OS +login MB
Average CPU load %
Tool installation size MB
Subnet scan time in minutes
execution threads
Can give up on problematic nodes
set ping time (ms)
Vulnerabilities found ranking
Patched vulnerabilities found ranking
Scan Time ranking
Bandwidth ranking
Memory usage ranking
Raw simple measure-based Ranking

Tool A
146 secs.
236
3,456,296
97,125
177 secs.
22
3,835,880
97,125
115 secs.
88
175,128
10,697
78 secs.
10
196,264
9,388
75 secs.
88
92,176
7,935
71 secs.
10
82,088
4,151
13.60
2.50
102
15
90
185
64
1
1,500
1
4
2
4
2
2

Tool B
717 secs.
90
50,480
21,160
1,711 secs.
29
104,472
18,000
1,235 secs.
6
54,256
133,989
1,318 secs.
14
18,648
32,966
2,274 secs.
38
51,200
23,348
1,941 secs.
35
20,576
70,553
56
2
102
3
250
131
128
0
3,000
4
2
4
3
3
4

Tool C
714 secs.
67
21,224
10,952
677 secs.
14
24,936
8,500
280 secs.
26
17,228
5,346
278 secs.
59
29,704
7,505
250 secs.
94
18,016
4,883.
323 secs.
101
32,040
9,204
23
88
65-157
4
44
360
256
0
3,000
2
1
3
1
4
3

Tool D
63.50 secs.
146
1,360,493
18,478
68 secs.
16
1,676,088
9,400
128 secs.
4
17,984
4,466
67 secs.
14
189,480
11,270
60 secs.
34
44,032
4,816
125 secs.
38
115,040
15,037
22.60
1.20
102
19
27
57
20
0
3,000
3
3
1
2
1
1
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Table A.14 TTOA Adversary Work Factor
Measure

Comments

Tool A

Remove DB,
What
happens? @
Wins

1. Error dialogs, limited functions; 2. 1
Error dialogs no function; 3. No
indications
If the database is missing, how 1
useful is this tool?

Tool B

Tool C

Tool D

2

3

2

0

0

0

Databases are at the heart of VAST tools since scan results are preserved there for
reporting and analysis. When the signatures were missing, none of the tools did well
though port scanning was possible. All tools notified the user of a problem with the
missing databases. This being the only measure present is also included in the best-fit
model.
Table A.15 TTOA Survivability
Measure
Resistance to
corruption of
executables,
configuration files,
database, ) @
Wins

Comments
Tool A
1=Set during
2
install,
2=instructions
provided, 3=not
set
0

Tool B
1

Tool C
3

Tool D
1

1

0

1

The survivability category differs from adversary work factor.

Survivability

assesses the anticipation of adversarial activities against the tool, and assesses how well the
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tool is prepared, or helps the user prepare to protect it in the event of attack. This is the sole
measure in this category and is used in the best-fit model.

Table A.16 TTOA Risks
Measure

Comments

Tool A

Tool B

Tool C

Tool D

Published
1=No, 2=yes,
vulnerabilities in
BugTraq, prior
12 months @

1

2

2

1

Vendor
vulnerability
response

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

2

2

2

1

2

6

4

4

4

1=Contact
information
exists, 2=no

Scanning
1=No, 2=denial
disrupts network potential,
3=denial by
default
Scans that start, 1=Yes,2=noo
complete
Inter-component 1=Encrypted,
security
2=Cleartext
Vendor is a
1=Public,
known entity
2=Private,
3=Non profit
Evaluation copy 1=Full function,
available
2=limited nodes
Wins

There are two measures here that best represent this category, the inter component
security between the VA scanner, and any results or control console, ruling out any that are
not protecting the connection. The best-fit model employs the existence of published
vulnerabilities against the tool in the past 12 months. The SecurityFocus BugTraq site is
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used here since they track a high number of vulnerabilities. The CERT vulnerability notes
database should be searched also when making this measurement.
Table A.17 TTOA Operational Limitations
Measure
Target device
support

Comments
1=Non specific,
2=vendor specific

Alerts when
analysis
completes
Host system
prerequisites
Customizable
checks,
configurations,
@
Access levels
on target
systems needed
Access level on
host system
needed
Wins

Tool A
2

Tool B
1

Tool C
1

Tool D
1

1=External, 2=e-mail, 2
3=tool dialog messages

3

3

1

Clearly stated – list here NTSP3,
MDAC
1=User definable,
3.
2=user configurable,
3=user selectable,
4=defaults only.
1=None,
3
2=administrator partial,
3=administrator only
1=None,
2,3
2=administrator partial,
3=administrator only
0

NT,MDAC

NT,MDAC

NT, MDAC

1.2

1.2

1.2

1,2,3

1,2,3

1,2,3

3

1,3

2,3

3

3

4

The limitations of a tool are not readily apparent when reading literature from the
vendors in most cases. Limitations should be identified to determine their acceptability in
the environment. The first row on device support determines whether the tool claims to
specialize or focus on a subset of all systems. Other tools are more general, and will often
present solutions for only common systems or problems. The host system prerequisites for
the tools are often similar, and bear examination for anything unreasonable within the
environment. The customizable checks measure considers whether checks are extensible
by the user, parametrically edited by the user, selected from the full set of checks, or
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whether no customization exists.

The access level measure determines the level of

privilege needed to use the tool. The tool should warn the user if insufficient privilege
exists to run it. However, if some functionality can be done with less privilege, the vendor
should document this. This is an example of the Least Privilege Principle of security. The
best-fit measure here is the customizable check writing and usage capability. The trend is
toward shorter times between vulnerability disclosure and exploitations against it. The user
must be able to react to this, and the tool must allow for immediate reaction to new
exploitations.

Table A.18 Summary
Points
All measures raw wins
Weighted wins via best-fit model
Best-fit measures points
Weighted best-fit model result

Tool A
71
137
14
24

Tool B
52
91
11
15

Tool C
24
45
2
4

Tool D
46
88
5
11

Table A.18 above presents the results of the best-fit measures model as applied to
the set of measures taken during the evaluation of the tools. The all measures raw wins
shows the number of wins, outright and ties for each tool. The weighted wins applies the
weightings defined for the categories of greater importance to all measures. This weighting
can be used to begin to discern suitability of a tool if the raw scores are close. The bottom
two rows isolate the measures used in the best-fit model, and apply them in a raw count,
and a weighted count, which is shown as the best-fit model result. We observe the best-fit
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model accurately tracks with the adjusted raw wins count for the sampling of measures and
tools in this study, indicating that Tool A would be preferred.

